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ABSTRACT
Vying for Relevancy in Stockholm: American Environmental
Nongovernmental Organizations and the 1972 UN Conference on the Human
Environment
Andrew Brown

This thesis examines the roles, ideologies, strategies, and behavior of American
environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs) during the 1972 United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment. This conference was the first major international
conference to address environmental issues. The Stockholm Conference was a meeting for
delegates representing national governments to dictate the direction of international
environmental regulation. The conference focused on the participation of nations but ENGOs
found venues through which to participate in the discussion on the human environment. In this
thesis, I argue that even though the official conference limited the participation of ENGOs, these
groups functioned as informal diplomats in Stockholm. Furthermore, as the U.S. delegation
opted to pursue more nationally-focused goals, American ENGOs promoted global-oriented
objectives. Thus, the presence of these organizations complicates the narrative of the United
States during the conference.
This thesis specifically focuses on three American organizations, the Sierra Club, the
National Audubon Society, and the Friends of the Earth International. During the preparatory
period of the conference and the conference itself, members of these groups acted as
commentators, mediators, discussants, delegates, protestors, and environmental experts. Through
their participation, they illuminate much about NGO diplomacy during the 1970s. American
ENGOs were unable to influence policy on a major scale during the conference, but their ability
to become visible on the international level during the conference established their relevancy as
diplomatic agents. ENGO diplomacy, though it grew to full stature in the 1980s, planted its roots
in the 1970s, during this conference. This thesis aims to show the impact these organizations had
on the conference and how the meeting in Stockholm influenced American ENGOs.
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Introduction:
A New Moment for the International Environment
In 1997, legislatures worldwide were deciding whether or not to ratify the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol.1 The treaty, if ratified, would be the greatest legislative step toward addressing the
environmental issue of climate change. The United States, surprisingly, failed to ratify the treaty
and took a giant step back from the position of global leader of environmental protection.
Declining to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was an ironic decision for the United States, which
twenty-five years earlier, vied to become the leader of global environmentalism. The 1972
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, Sweden, was the
arena for the United States to assert itself as the leader of the new issue of the human
environment.
On July 30, 1968, the United Nations passed Resolution 1346, a document
recommending to plan and convene a conference on the human environment. The resolution was
a response to the Swedish delegate Sverker Astrom’s call for a conference to address
environmental issues. The call was not in response to a specific environmental catastrophe or
policy, but rather due to the environmental impact of economic development, which is the
process of implementing strategic policies to encourage economic growth.2 Astrom stated, that
“The Swedish government was concerned with the change in the natural surroundings of man
brought about, without adequate control, by the use of modern technology advances in industry

1

David Victor, Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 1.
2
For important books on the development, consult The History of Development by Gilbert Rist, which
looks at development through an international lens, Mandarins of the Future by Nils Gilman, which looks at
development and its relationship to modernization theory in Cold War America, and Globalization and its
Discontents by Joseph Stiglitz, which focuses on international organizations including the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank in the context of Third World economic development.
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and agriculture and its impact on man itself.”3 Development and its impact on the environment
were important issues at the Stockholm Conference. Sweden hoped that the conference would
give “outlook and direction” to the United Nations and national governments on issues
surrounding the human environment.4
The resolution established simple goals for the United Nations in constructing the
conference. The document stated that UN members were aware of the environmental perils that
plagued the world and the continuing efforts by governments and non-state actors to address
those problems. In addition, it recommended that “the General Assembly… consider ways and
means to further the objectives set out above including, in particular, the desirability of
convening a United Nations conference on problems of the human environment.”5 The United
Nations saw the conference as a way to further its objectives on economic development, peace,
and international cooperation. At this time there was some discussion of economic policy at the
international level but the U.N. conference was the first major meeting on this important issue.
The United States attempted to use the conference as an attempt to establish itself as the leader of
the international environmental movement. The conference sparked a dialogue and in the
following years, members of the United Nations saw their ambition to start a conversation
manifest into a political reality.
The conversation to address the international environment was rooted in the Cold War
narrative of the 1960s and 1970s. The United States sought to establish itself as a leader in the
international environment during the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment. The conference sparked the dialogue on the relation between man’s social,

3

Richard Johnston, “UN Health Study Urged by Sweden,” New York Times, May 23, 1968.
Ibid, 1.
5
“United Nations Resolution 1346,” United Nations, accessed June 27, 2014,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/RES/1346(XLV)
4
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political, and economic systems and numerous aspects of the natural environment. National
delegations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), members of the transnational
counterculture movement, and the press all met in Stockholm, Sweden from June 5-16, 1972,
each vying for an opportunity to frame the budding debate on the international environment.
These groups disagreed on specific policies and approaches to solving the world’s environmental
catastrophes but all parties agreed that a conversation must commence. State and non-state actors
used formal and informal forums to produce constructive and sometimes accusatory dialogue on
the global environment. The focus of this thesis is about non-state actors, especially the
Americans, in the context of the Stockholm Conference.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the roles, ideologies, strategies, and impact of a
largely neglected group in the Stockholm conference narrative, American environmental NGOs
(ENGOs). These environmental organizations, as the subsequent pages show, served as effective
informal diplomatic agents and complicate the story of the United States at the conference.
Furthermore, their efforts in Stockholm laid the foundation for more involved NGO diplomacy
during the next few decades. The chapters outline the narrative of the conference
chronologically. The first chapter discusses the American and international environmental
movements within the context of the American and international political climates. American
and international environmental movements illuminate the issues of importance to delegates and
non-state actors in Stockholm and the way the lingering Cold War influenced these issues on an
international level.
The various parties that participated in formal and informal domestic and international
committees sought to set the agenda for the conference; this is the focus of chapter two. Nonstate actors assembled through UN-sponsored and independent forums to discuss the questions

4

posed by the non-state community. These meetings produced policy alternatives, rhetorical
backlashes, and a variety of competing visions on the role of American environmental NGOs in
world affairs. The American meetings framed the debate at the conference, which is the focus of
chapter three. American environmental NGOs assembled at the UN-sponsored Environmental
Forum, printed newspaper articles, protested contemporary military and political policies by the
United States, and functioned as observers at the official conference. Their multifaceted roles
provide an interesting view into the formal and informal venues through which NGO actors
function during multilateral negotiations. Their ability to make their positions on the issues
known and capacity to organize on an international level altered the foundations of 1970s
diplomacy, which scholars have depicted as state-centered.6 For the first time American ENGOs
made their voices heard although national delegations ultimately dictated policy. The failure by
environmental NGOs to influence policy forms the prism through which historians, policy
experts, and international relations specialists have viewed NGOs role at the conference and to
their scholarship this thesis hopes to add a new interpretation of informal actors in Stockholm.
American ENGOs are the focus of this study and considered primary actors for several
reasons. The rise in prominence of environmental organizations in political discourse and the
convening of the Stockholm Conference are products of the environmental movement and
therefore ENGOs and the conference are important aspects of the modern environmental
narrative. Citizens functioned through ENGOs on a local, regional, and national level alongside
politicians, lobbyists, and environmentalists. The U.N. Conference on the Human Environment

6

Consult NGO Diplomacy, edited by Michelle Betsill and Elisabeth Correll who primarily refer to NGO
diplomacy starting in the 1980s and The History of Development by Gilbert Rist who refers to NGO Diplomacy
during the period of structural adjustment in the 1980s. Some historians are beginning to refer to NGOs making a
large impact before the 1980s, primarily in the realm of humanitarian affairs. For these views, consult Making the
World Safe by Julia Irwin and Diplomacy and Negotiation for Humanitarian NGOs by Larry Roeder and Albert
Simard.
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was the first opportunity for environmentally-minded citizens, activists, and politicians to assert
themselves prominently on the international level. Prior to the conference, national organizations
such as the Sierra Club and National Audubon Society had no experience lobbying at the
international level because the modern era of international environmental decision-making began
with Stockholm.7 Their participation complicates our understanding of the United States’ role at
Stockholm, in that, their globally focused goals diverge from the self-interested goals of the
official US delegation. The United States’ delegation, as the subsequent pages will show,
approached the conference with national interests in mind. While this may not seem surprising,
the slogan of the conference “Only One Earth,” leads one to believe that this conference served
as a new era of international cooperation. Instead, as this thesis later shows, governments, under
the guise of international unity, fought to protect their economic and political interests. The
United States sought to protect its interests in economic development, foster good relations with
the Third World, and project itself as the benevolent leader in global environmentalism.
American ENGOs, as will be discussed later, approached the conference with more
globally-oriented goals and advocated for strict environmental regulation that transcended Cold
War politics. While American ENGOs did not come to a consensus on how international
environmental regulation would unfold, these organizations clearly believed that the
environment took primacy over national interests and thus were often at odds with the formal
delegation’s goals. Analyzing both the formal and informal actors’ action during the 1972
conference presents a more holistic view of the birth of international environmentalism in the
early 1970s.

7

Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, “Introduction to NGO Diplomacy,” in NGO Diplomacy: The
Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations, eds. Michele Betsill and
Elisabeth Corell (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 1.
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This thesis focuses on a few prominent American ENGOs, the Sierra Club, the National
Audubon Society, and the Friends of the Earth International. These organizations were chosen
due to their status at the time of the conference. The Sierra Club and the National Audubon
Society were two notable environmental organizations in the United States and the Friends of the
Earth International was one of only a few international ENGOs and made a significant impact at
the conference. These organizations were based in the United States and while NGOs
representing the developed and developing world were present in Stockholm, this thesis focuses
on American ENGOs because, as Stephen Hopgood notes, the United States dominated at the
conference due to its greater access to environmental research and experience with
environmental legislation and politics.8 American ENGOs were a part of the dissemination of
environmental knowledge and part of the policy process at the national level. Therefore, a
conversation on American ENGOs in Stockholm also leads to a discussion on the role of the
United States at the conference.
John Muir founded the Sierra Club in the late 19th century. The organization started as a
wilderness organization and spent much of its initial efforts on the issue of conservation and
forestry. By the 1940s, the Sierra Club battled development projects such as building dams and
hydroelectric facilities in the states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.9 As time
progressed, the organization shifted from regional and local environmental grassroots issues to
national legislation. The organization spent much of the 1950s and 1960s lobbying for the
Wilderness Act.10 In addition to the legislative aspect of the Sierra Club, the organization was

8

Stephen Hopgood, American Foreign Environmental Policy and the Power of the State, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998), 92-96.
9
Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement
(Washington DC: Island Press, 1993), 41.
10
Ibid, 43.
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also known for their mountain climbing, skiing, and backpacking trips they organized for
members.11
The Friends of the Earth organization grew out of the Sierra Club. David Brower, who
had been a top official for the Sierra Club, created the Friends of the Earth in 1969. Brower’s
organization, he envisioned, would “pursue certain issues and strategies that the Sierra Club had
not or would not pursue. These included a greater emphasis on international issues… (and) a
more direct ideological role through an expanded publishing effort.”12 Brower wanted to focus
less on formulating policy and work on influencing the public and policy makers. His
organizational goals help explain the Friends of the Earth’s primary contribution to the
conference, the creation of the world’s first environmental newspaper, Stockholm Conference
Eco.
The National Audubon Society, like the Sierra Club, was born out of the progressive
movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The organization was primarily interested in
the topic of wildlife conservation, namely birds. While the organization primarily served as a
traditional club for bird enthusiasts and influencing public opinion, the club made a swift turn in
the 1960s with the election of Elvis Stahr Jr. as president. Stahr was interested in transforming
the organization into an important player in the policy-making arena.13 Stahr was a former
Secretary of the Army and presidents of Indiana University and West Virginia and therefore had
several connections on the state and national levels. While the National Audubon Society and the
Sierra Club were established organizations and the Friends of the Earth was new to the
environmental movement, all three organizations faced a new challenge when they prepared for
the conference and met in Stockholm to discuss the human environment.
11

Ibid, 41.
Ibid, 144.
13
Ibid, 152.
12
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Historiography
Environmental diplomacy is a relatively new field in the historiography of US foreign
relations. Kurk Dorsey’s book The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy was one of the first
instances in which a diplomatic scholar focused on environmental issues in the context of foreign
relations and pioneered the sub discipline of environmental diplomacy.14 In 2013, Dorsey noted
on the state of the field of environmental diplomacy that,
Environmental historians have written important books about international
subjects, and several historians of science have contributed to what we might
broadly consider to be a merger of environmental and diplomatic history, but only
a handful of historians of foreign relations have found fruitful research questions
in the ways that diplomacy has altered the state of the planet.15
Dorsey’s work provides an alternative approach to international environmentalism by using
diplomacy as the primary focus of investigation. Since Dorsey’s work, few books have been
produced on the topic of environmental diplomacy. Dorsey notes that J.R. McNeil and Jacob
Hamblin16 have been prolific authors in the field, but neither scholar comes from a diplomatic
background.17 Environmental diplomacy attempts to bring together the fields of diplomatic
history, environmental history, and the history of science and this thesis seeks to be a
contribution to that field.
A more recent contribution to the field of environmental diplomacy is the edited
collection titled Environmental Histories of the Cold War edited by J.R. McNeill and Corinna
Unger. As a collection, the book shows the complex relationship between important aspects of
the Cold War and the environment such as proxy wars, agriculture, Cold War infrastructure such
14

William Cronon, “Forward,” in Whales and Nations: Environmental Diplomacy on the High Seas, by
Kurk Dorsey (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013), ix.
15
Kurk Dorsey, “Perhaps I was Mistaken: Writing About Environmental Diplomacy Over the Past
Decade,” Passport 44, no. 1 (April 2013): 37.
16
For books on environmental diplomacy, specifically on the issues of experts, nuclear weapons, and
human ecology, produced by Hamblin refer to Oceanographers and the Cold War and Poison in the Well and for
McNeill consult Mosquito Empires and Something New Under the Sun.
17
Kurk Dorsey, “Perhaps I was Mistaken”, 37.
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as dams and highways, military bases, and nuclear weaponry.18 The military and economic
aspects of the Cold War had significant impacts on the environment. The editors state that while
modern environmentalism had many parents and grandparents, it was also a child of the Cold
War.19 The environmental movement appealed to anti-war protesters in the United States, was a
critique of capitalism in the Soviet Union, and was the safest way to criticize the state in China.20
Environmentalism was an important part of the Cold War and each topic influenced the other in
profound ways as this thesis will later show. While the editors of this collection argue that
environmentalism was a part of Détente,21 as an issue that could bring East and West together,
the conference in Stockholm rather illuminated the political and economic polarities of the Cold
War.
This thesis further converges with the historiographies of international political history
and environmental history. In order to understand the actions, ideologies, and strategies of the
various diplomatic agents, it is important to contextualize the conference with how it fits in
within environmental, international, and political narratives. The Stockholm Conference, which
convened in 1972, occurred during an important moment of international political history.
Various groups challenged the East-West power politics of the Cold War. During the 1960s, the
Third World began to come together through movements and institutions such as the Nonaligned
Movement. These countries made a commitment to an independent foreign policy, peaceful
coexistence, to support national liberation movements, and to avoid Cold War alliances.22 China,
on the other hand, was experiencing a time of transformation at the dawn of the Stockholm
18

J.R. McNeill and Corinna Unger, “The Big Picture,” in Environmental Histories of the Cold War, eds.
J.R. McNeill and Corinna Unger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5.
19
Ibid, 11.
20
Ibid, 12.
21
Ibid, 13.
22
Mark Lawrence, “The Rise and Fall of Nonalignment,” in The Cold War in the Third World, ed. Robert
McMahon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 144.
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Conference. In 1972, the Sino-Soviet Split and Sino-American rapprochement influenced
Chinese foreign policy, as China started to normalize relations with the United States, and China
was on the verge of sharing its Three World Thesis.23 Two years after the conference, Mao
Zedong introduced his Three World Thesis and stated that China was part of the Third World.24
Global political transformations, such as the Nonaligned Movement and the geopolitical
evolution of China, significantly influenced the Stockholm deliberations as the developing world
resisted many of the environmental proposals of the developed world and China sought to
become the leader of the nonaligned states. Therefore, as this thesis will later discuss, the
geographical and political divisions American ENGOs encountered at the conference were an
effect of political maneuvers in the 1960s and 1970s.
While China and the Third World aimed to challenge the power of the US and USSR,
international groups also engaged with important aspects of the post-World War II era such as
environmentalism and economic development. Authors, experts, and organizations challenged
the concept of development and undertook international environmental programs before the
Stockholm Conference. The discourse surrounding economic development was changed when
international economists such as Hans Singer, Barbara Ward, Raul Prebisch, Gunnar Myrdal, Jan
Tinbergen, and others began combining social reform with development, the idea of “growth
plus change.”25 Books such as the Limits of the Earth by Fairfield Osborne and The Limits to
Growth by Donella Meadows warned of a catastrophic future due to unrestricted population
growth and mismanagement of natural resources.

23

Chen Jian, “China, the Third World, and the Cold War,” in The Cold War and the Third World, ed.
Robert McMahon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 96.
24
Ibid, 85.
25
Iris Borowy, Defining Sustainable Development for our Common Future: A History of the World
Commission on Environment and Development (New York: Routledge, 2013), 20.
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Organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) and the International Biological Program (IBP), alongside the
economists named earlier, focused on efforts of the international environment. These
organizations instituted efforts to address environmental issues on an international scale. The
Man and the Biosphere program (MBP), a program of UNESCO created in 1971, “supported the
designation of areas where economic activities should serve environmental protection.”26 In
other words, the areas governed by the MBP served as “demonstrations for cooperation in
building harmonious relationships between human activities and the conservation of ecosystems
and biological diversity.”27 The IBP, also addressed issues of the human environment,
intertwined with the issue of development.
“The International Biological Program (IBP) grew out of mounting
scientific concern throughout the world for the major problems confronting
mankind… rapidly increasing population, food shortages and environmental
destruction. As early as 1959, scientists began discussing the possibilities of
organizing an international program dealing with increasing food supplies and
keeping the earth a fit place to live.28
In the early 1970s, national organizations began implementing international programs to
contribute to the advances made by international organizations in the 1950s and 1960s. National
NGOs sought to contribute in an arena where they had previously been neglected. Before the
Stockholm Conference, environmental organizations only played a limited role in the United
Nations.29 Organizations such as the Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society used the
burgeoning field of international environmentalism to transform their organizations in
fundamental ways. By the time of the Stockholm Conference, several groups and experts were
26

Ibid, 27.
United States Man and the Biosphere Program, Biosphere Reserves in Action: Case Studies of American
Experience (Washington DC: Department of State, 1995), v.
28
Man’s Survival in a Changing World: United States Participation in the International Biological
Program, Box B-340, Folder 6, National Audubon Society Archives, New York Public Library, New York, NY.
29
Ken Conca, “NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance,” in Environmental Organizations and the UN
System, eds. Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 104.
27
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discussing the looming doom and advocating for a new, eco-friendly version of development or a
curb in development activities.
The type of environmentalism exhibited by these American ENGOs at the Stockholm
Conference is very specific. In the United States, environmentalists branded the environmental
movement as a grassroots, democratic process. Social activists in early 20th century Chicago
utilized the community to address environmental issues in the workplace and human settlements,
while members of the counterculture latched onto the modern environmental movement as a
medium for social change.30 This is a unique kind of environmentalism but the historiography of
international environmentalism, specifically within the British Empire, shows a different way in
which environmentalism exhibited in the world.
Environmentalism within the British Empire manifested through the process of
colonization. Richard Grove, a notable British historian on environmental history, argued that the
origins of Western environmentalism go far back in time, to the days of European colonization.31
Environmentalism was born out of the process of imperialism and was concocted in the tropical
colonies. Two ideas greatly influenced the idea of Western environmentalism, the garden and the
island. The idea of the garden originated from the colonizer’s contact with the natural beauty of
the tropics. It represented man’s redemption and returning to the paradise of Eden. The island
was an allegory for the entire earth. The tropics served as models of the world and exhibited, on
a micro-scale, man’s impact on his natural environment.32 These ideas together served as the
impetus for the Western version of environmentalism.

30

Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement, 63-

98.
31

Richard Groves, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens and the Origins of
Environmentalism, 1600-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1.
32
Ibid, 13.
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While the ideological currents in the colonial form of environmentalism were similar to
that of this social movement in the United States, the implementation of environmental
regulation differs in fundamental ways. The environmental movement in the United States
formed from the ground-up but the government and scientists in the British colonial context
governed the same process. A group of highly influential scientists and politicians developed the
three-part ecology of the British Empire, nature, knowledge, and society.33 Therefore,
environmentalism was not a democratic but rather an autocratic process. Scientists argued that
instead of leaving natural areas, such as the forest, autonomous, it should be managed and
improved by science.34 The British Empire managed their colonial lands and forced
environmental regulation on the native population. People of the colonies viewed
environmentalism as a police action and abusive.35
Environmentalism, in the context of the British Empire, illuminates much about the
Stockholm Conference. First, the importance of experts, as scientists appeared in Stockholm as
advisors and members of international organizations such as Dai Dong and Founex. Secondly,
the Third World’s contact with environmentalism started in the context of colonization. To the
Third World, it was an autocratic process imposed on their society rather than a grassroots
movement to protect their community. Lastly, that environmentalism held antiquated origins.
The delegates in Stockholm, official or informal, approached an issue the world contemplated for
several centuries. The issue of environmental protection was an important topic in the context of
the Cold War and there was no easy answer to the complex problem debated in Stockholm.

33

Peder Anker, Imperial Ecology: Environmental Order in the British Empire, 1895-1945 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2002), 2.
34
Gregory Barton, Empire Forestry and the Origins of Environmentalism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 37.
35
Ibid, 6-165.
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The literature on the conference emphasizes the Stockholm meeting’s importance to
global environmentalism but rarely engages with the conference on its own terms. Most
historians, environmental policy experts, and political scientists contend that this conference was
the beginning of the larger international environmental movement and argue that it provided the
framework for subsequent environmental negotiations. Yet, despite its importance, scholars
primarily discuss the conference as historical context for more recent meetings rather than as the
principal topic of study. The absence of detailed research about the conference calls for
historians to study this important event in history on its own terms.
Only a few works exist that focus primarily on the conference. Stephen Hopgood’s book
entitled American Foreign Environmental Policy and the Power of the State is the most
comprehensive study of the conference. Hopgood, a political scientist, believed that America’s
role at the conference can be explained through its power in world affairs. He argued that
America’s prominence at the conference was rooted in its experience in environmental affairs
and economic ability to carry out environmental initiatives.36 Furthermore, he maintains that the
United States’ capacity for environmental research and implementation of new environmental
technology allowed for America to assume a leadership position on an issue that was relatively
new on the international stage.37 While Hopgood’s analysis clarifies how the United States
became the major actor at the conference, he fails to conclude what shaped their goals and what
motivated the delegation to pursue a leadership position in the conference. America’s approach
to the conference in Stockholm, as this thesis shows, was influenced by self-interested goals.
John Cohrssen, a prolific author on the environment, adds to the field of environmental
diplomacy. He argues that the United States has deferred environmental sovereignty to

36
37

Stephen Hopgood, American Foreign Environmental Policy and the Power of the State, 92.
Ibid, 96.
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international organizations.38 In essence, the United States has allowed the United Nations to
manage environmental diplomacy rather than becoming an issue part of bilateral agreements
between nations. The issue of sovereignty is important in regards to the topic of international
environmentalism. The United States rarely elects to sacrifice it, developing countries feared
losing it, and ENGOs sought to strengthen international standards rather than focus on each
nation’s right to self-determination. International forums tend to provide justification for the
programs promoted by the United States. State actors, as much of this thesis shows, acted with
self-interest and economic interests at heart. ENGOs acted with more globally-oriented goals.
While the United States elected to vie for sovereignty on the topic of environmental
issues, the conference itself fits within the issue of European liberal internationalism. After the
Bretton Woods Conference, European nations advocated for international institutions to play a
larger role in world affairs.39 During the Cold War, these institutions took the form of the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank and after the Cold War, institutions such as the
World Trade Organization and European Union emerged.40 The Stockholm Conference, as it
acted within a United Nations context, fit within this new era of international negotiations. While
the conference occurred within this context, governments still approached the conference with
their own agendas and priorities concerning the human environment.
The most comprehensive study on NGOs at the conference is Wade Rowland’s book Plot
to Save the World. In his study, he devotes a chapter to non-state actors at the Stockholm
Conference. Rowland dismisses much of the efforts of non-state actors in Stockholm and with
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the exception of the international group Dai Dong concludes that, “Other activities of the group
(NGOs) were, however, little more helpful that those of the Life Forum.”41 The Environmental
Forum, which was the gathering of NGOs, and the Life Forum,42 the gathering of international
activist youth, garners little attention from Rowland as either group had little impact on policy
but as this study shows, the informal arena of diplomacy illuminates the deep-seeded impact of
these actors at the conference. Though he dismisses the impression ENGOs made on the
conference and environmental diplomacy more broadly, he does name the environmental
organizations the “official conscience for the UN delegates.”43 Because ENGOs did not have to
answer to national interests, they formed more ideological agendas and their presence at the
conference displayed their vision for a green future.
Note on Context and Sources
The pages that follow chronicle the actions, ideologies, and impacts of a group
marginalized in the historiography but their deeds cannot be understood on their own. While the
environmental NGOs may have been the official conscience of Stockholm, they were not the
only voice. This research places the narrative of these informal actors and the conference within
the parallel discourse on state actors and the wider world in the 1960s and 1970s. By using this
strategy to relay the story of these organizations, I hope to show their importance and the
diversity they brought to this new moment in international environmentalism. To do this, I have
drawn from extensive archival and published primary sources, including the papers from the

41

Wade Rowland, The Plot to Save the World: The Life and Times of the Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1973), 125.
42
The Stockholm Conference had three major meetings occurring simultaneously. The official conference
consisted of governmental delegations and produced the official declaration on the human environment. The
Environmental Forum was the meeting of NGOs from around the world and was made up of workshops, lectures,
and film viewings. The Life Forum, also known as the People’s Forum or Folklet’s Forum, was a meeting of
primarily leftist youth who held meetings called POW WOWs and spent much of their time protesting imperial
powers present at the conference.
43
Wade Rowland, The Plot to Save the World, 121.

17

Sierra Club Archives, the National Audubon Society Archives, the Richard Nixon Presidential
Library, the National Archives at College Park, and the United Nations Archives. Among my
secondary sources, I draw from the literature created by historians, environmentalists, public
policy experts, political scientists, and public officials. By using these diversified archival and
secondary sources, I wish to paint a more holistic picture of the conference in Stockholm; what
follows is the manifestation of that mission. The American ENGOs discussed throughout this
thesis accumulated a modest amount of relevancy during the Stockholm Conference but NGO
diplomacy, as scholar Sangeeta Kamat shows, became a “global phenomenon” in the 1980s.44
For American ENGOs such as the Sierra Club, the National Audubon Society, and the Friends of
the Earth, their relevancy in international took root during the Stockholm Conference.
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Chapter 1:
Background and Context
On March 27, 1972, about two months before the conference, the Department of State
sent a letter to Raymond Sherwin, the president of the Sierra Club, about the issue of East
Germany’s admittance to the conference. The letter began, “We share your concern over the
threatened boycott of the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment by the Soviet Union and
we trust the USSR will ultimately decide to attend.”45 The State Department’s letter was a
response to the Sierra Club’s recommendation of East Germany’s admittance to the World
Health Organization, which would make them eligible to participate in the 1972 conference. If
East Germany was barred from the conference, the USSR threatened to boycott. The Sierra Club
recognized that a boycott of the conference by the Soviet bloc would severely compromise its
results and conflicted with the conference’s theme of global unity. While the issue of East
Germany’s exclusion at the conference is described in detail in the next chapter, this dispute is
one instance of how political, social, and economic processes ultimately shaped the conference.
Contemporary events shaped the conference and the actors within it as well. The 1972
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, and especially the role of American
Environmental NGOs in the conference, was shaped by several American domestic and
international developments. To explore these developments, this chapter will focus on three
factors that influenced events in Stockholm, including the emergence of the modern
environmental movement, the Cold War, and the 1960s and 1970s political climate.
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The Environmental Movement
The American Environmental Movement
The American environmental movement has a long history. Since the nation’s inception,
there have been environmentally focused individuals, but an organized movement first emerged
in the late nineteenth century but became increasingly popular in the 1960s. Kirk Dorsey argues
that modern environmentalists are following in the footsteps of Progressive Era
conservationists.46 During that time, the United States joined in wildlife protection treaties with
Canada. Conservationists argued that fish, seals, and birds did not adhere to national boundaries,
so environmentalists started looking at the environment through transnational lenses. The
government acknowledged that conservation was not simply a domestic issue. There was a
newfound awareness that nations needed to cooperate with each other in order to promote
conservation.47
Conservation issues mobilized environmentalists in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, but one must question, what spurred the environmentalist’s activism?
According to Lester Milbrath, a political scientist:
“The plentiful supply of cheap land in the new world led many immigrant settlers
to exploit land ruthlessly, with little concern for future generations. Land was
treated as a commodity, enabling some people to get rich quickly; this also led to
widespread speculation in land ownership. The exploitive mentality toward land
was carried to such an extreme that it created a reaction that took the form of the
Conservation Movement.”48
The beginnings of the Conservation movement is closely linked with the push west by eighteenth
and nineteenth century Americans. Early settlers saw the space as virgin land and this
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glamorized view convinced many Americans to preserve what they saw as the land’s natural
integrity. Americans moving west were able to buy land cheap and the abundance of “open
land”49 decreased its intrinsic value to settlers and homesteaders. The fear of mass degradation of
the land drove Progressive Era environmentalists to act.
The interests of American environmentalists evolved over time and embodied several
issues. Progressive era conservationists sought to protect natural resources and early in the
movement, this meant the forests.50 Conservationists sought to protect unspoiled natural space
through federal law, such as establishing state and federal park programs. Yellowstone National
Park, established in 1872 by Ulysses S. Grant, was the first national park in the United States.
Teddy Roosevelt expanded the number of parks in the country and took a picture with John Muir
when he visited Yosemite. Woodrow Wilson signed the National Park Service into law in 1916,
formalizing the United States’ commitment to cultural land conservation. It is important to note
though that their devotion to land conservation did not reduce their belief in economic and
industrial development. Conservationists accepted the existing “economic-social-political
arrangements of society… Most of them saw no conflict between conservation and economic
growth”51 This stance mirrors the nineteenth century vision of the West, a pristine natural
wonderland with the possibility of economic and industrial prosperity. After decades of
industrial development, “Human degradation of the environment advanced to what many began
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to believe was an alarming level; the movement began transforming from a conservation
movement to an environmental protection movement.”52
Progressive Era environmentalists generated ideas about the environment, which
appeared throughout the twentieth century in the United States. After the Dust Bowl, scientists
focused on the issue of soil conservation. The U.S. government created the United States Soil
Conservation Service in 1932 and Hugh Bennett served as its Chief. Bennett worked to improve
soil conditions at the home but also brought his expertise abroad including making trips to South
Africa in the mid-1940s.53 Efforts to protect the environment lasted throughout the twentieth
century but the modern environmental movement began in 1962. The ideology that propelled
environmentalism was self-preservation. It acknowledged that human survival on the planet was
dependent on the status of its environment. As Maurice Strong, the general secretary of the
conference stated:
The insight that humans inflict damage on themselves by damaging nature has
become a basic premise of modern environmentalism as it emerged as a major
and influential movement during the second half of the twentieth century…
Impacts [on the environment] were dramatically pointed out by Rachel Carson in
her influential book, Silent Spring (1962).54
Rachel Carson’s book on pesticide use, particularly DDT, argued that pesticides were hurting
birds, plants, other animals, and humans. Self-preservation, an idea prominent in Silent Spring,
prompted a mass movement by individuals all over the nation to protest on behalf of the
environment.
Self-preservation is consistent with the ideology employed by progressive era
conservationists. “They [Conservationists] skillfully combined the romantic view [of nature]
52
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with Christian conceptions of American prairies and forests, sensing that the wilderness was
inextricably bound up with national character and destiny.”55 Whether it was preservation of the
nation or preservation of the human species, popular environmentalism sought to safeguard the
aspect of the environment that connected with humankind. American ENGOs used the idea of
self-preservation to influence the populace and delegates at the Stockholm Conference but also
held to a different ideology that influenced their policy proposals.
John Muir’s approach to the environment influenced activists in the 1960s and early
1970s. Muir, “saw man immersed in nature rather than lord over nature.”56 Through this
approach, modern environmentalists saw an inherent value in nature separate from man’s
connection with it. This difference between conservation and preservation is an important aspect
of environmentalism. The American conservation movement sought to better manage the
abundance of resources in the United States.57 Preservation, on the other hand, sought to protect
the environment from harm. The divergence of these ideas occurs for an important reason. The
battle for conservationism took place in national parks and forest lands whereas
environmentalism and preservationism occurred in industrial, urban, and agricultural areas.58
The early American environmental movement was split into three different groups. First
were those interested in public health concerns.59 Silent Spring resonated with these activists.
They participated in campaigns against DDT, Agent Orange, and herbicides. The second group
was interested in the conservation of land and natural resources.60 This included groups like the
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Sierra Club, which supported legislation protecting wildlife, water, and air. The third group
appeared in the 1960s and was less interested in the issue of the environment than fighting the
establishment.61 This was a younger group of activists who used the issue of the environment as
an outlet for their rebellion and rage against the government.
At the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s, the public showed its concern about the
environment through the growth of ENGOs. The number of organizations and the size of each
organization grew tremendously throughout this period. Before 1960, on average three new
environmental organizations appeared per year in America, after 1960, each year averaged
eighteen new organizations.62 The growth of environmental organizations in the United States
made environmentalism an important political force.
The momentum of the American environmental movement led to important federal
institutional changes and legislative initiatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s. These changes
were also in response to contemporary environmental disasters that caught the attention of the
public. In 1969, two environmental disasters prompted a backlash from the public. The Santa
Barbara oil spill and the fire on the Cuyahoga River created public pressure on the Nixon
administration to develop methods to protect the environment, which responded by establishing
the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in 1969 and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in 1970.63 Preceding the Stockholm Conference, Nixon initiated Earth Day on April 20,
1970, one of the many environmental enterprises created as a testament to Nixon’s pledge to the
environment. National delegates voted during the conference to name June 5 as World
Environment Day. Through this vote, national delegations decided to promote internationally a
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sentiment that was already growing in the United States. It is important to note though that the
American environmental movement was only one cog in the wheel of environmentalism.
Developments on the international stage also influenced the conference and the NGOs that acted
in it.
Environmental Movements Abroad
The United States was a major player in the growth of the environmental movement, but
it was far from the only participant in environmental affairs. As John McCormick, the notable
political scientist, stated, “The movement did not begin in one country and then spread to
another; it emerged in different places at different times.”64 The modern environmental
movement took different forms in different countries. The forms these movements took
influenced the philosophical approaches nations and non-state actors formulated during the
build-up to the Stockholm conference. Therefore, to understand the ideologies of the various
actors in Stockholm in 1972, it is important to contextualize their efforts by discussing the
environmental movements appearing around the world. As discussed earlier, environmentalism
throughout the last few hundred years was both an autocratic and democratic process.
Environmentalism served as a function in imperial processes and grassroots efforts. American
ENGOs saw themselves as part of a grassroots democratic movement, therefore the next few
pages will primarily focus on grassroots environmental movements during the twentieth
century.65
Why were these environmental movements appearing in several parts of the developed
world? As J.R. McNeil notes, “The twentieth century was unusual for the intensity of change and
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the centrality of human effort in provoking it.”66 The evolution of technology, the budding role
of modernization projects67, the growing destructive capacity of weaponry, and the mounting
attention given to economic growth increased man’s ability to manipulate and degrade his
environment. The rising capacity for man to influence his natural surroundings spawned
ecological disasters that captured the attention of the public but it was clear that the disasters had
to form a recognizable danger in order to merit a response from the citizenry:
Domestic politics in open societies proved mildly more responsive to
environmental problems that annoyed citizens than did more authoritarian
societies, especially after 1970, but there were clear limits to the ecological
prudence that citizens wanted. Regardless of political system, policy makers at all
levels from local to international responded more readily to clear and present
dangers (and opportunities) than to the more subtle and gradual worries about the
environment. More jobs, higher tax revenues, and stronger militaries all appealed,
with an immediate lure that cleaner air or diversified ecosystems could not
match.68
Contemporary troubles, rather than apocalyptic jargon, spurred citizens to mobilize for
environmental protection. Environmental disasters occurred across the globe and as we shall see
in the cases of Britain, France, and Czechoslovakia, environmentalism brought forth various
methods to enacting environmental regulation and generated environmental philosophies adopted
by ENGOs during the 1972 Stockholm conference.
Britain has a long-standing history with environmentalism. Their attentiveness to
environmental dangers made them a pioneer of environmental regulation in Europe. Their
relationship with environmental protection goes beyond the era of progressive conservationism
but dates back to the thirteenth century.
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Britain has an impressive record in recognizing and responding to environmental
degradation. In 1273 it passed what may have been the world’s first piece of
antipollution legislation (a decree prohibiting the burning of sea coal). In 1863 it
set up the first pollution control agency (the Alkali Inspectorate)… In 1956 it was
the first major industrialized nation to pass a clean air act. In 1970 it created the
world’s first cabinet-level “environment department.”69
Domestically, Britain’s road to environmental protection primarily passed through the walls of
Parliament. In addition, as stated in the introduction, environmentalism in the imperial context
was managed by politicians and scientists. To compliment these efforts, citizens joined ENGOs
and advocated for natural preservation but Britain’s great strides came through the government’s
adoption of environmental standards and environment-affiliated governmental agencies. Other
nations, the United States in particular, conformed to this method and governments asserted
themselves as important agents in the fight against looming environmental perils. Many
developed nations at the Stockholm conference, including the United States, thought nationally
administered environmental programs was the most efficient and prudent method to implement
environmental regulation around the world. This approach, originally, did not apply to all nations
though, as France’s move toward environmentalism bred from anti-governmental attitudes.
In France, negative opinions of the state gave rise to environmentally focused
movements. Strict pro-environment philosophies fit within the political climate in France in the
1960s. French protesters sought new frontiers in which to clash with the government. These
activists saw the state as the primary instigator of environmental degradation and started to fight
the centralized government on that front. In this case, environmentalism fit in with the popular
anti-statist and anti-consumer attitudes of the time.70 Ironically, the quest for strict environmental
regulation led to a stronger centralized government and the state became a key component into
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accomplishing that goal. However, the environmental movement in France did not bring about
the desired effects its proponents, a weaker centralized government; it illustrates how discontent
among the masses can spawn the genesis of a major social movement. The rise of the
counterculture in the late 1960s and early 1970s similarly interacted with the environmental
movement and appeared, although in a modest fashion, at the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment.
The environmental movement in Soviet Union controlled Czechoslovakia illuminates
how environmental thought became part of the globalization process in the 1960s and 1970s. The
Soviet Union, under its five-year plans, sought to industrialize exponentially. In the satellite
states, such as Czechoslovakia, this caused rampant urban-escapism as people sought to get back
to nautre.71 Individuals from these states became more environmentally conscious. This
development led to the creation of a few ENGOs including the Nature Conservation Section
under the auspices of the National Museum Society.72 From this organization sprouted a more
organized environmental group, comprised of experts on the conservation, called Tis. This
organization lost funds from the government because their goals conflicted with the industrially
minded goals of the USSR. In order to raise funds, the experts started consulting with national
agencies and later began exporting their knowledge to Third World countries such as Peru,
Kenya, and Vietnam.73 Internationally, environmentalism was a joint effort of scientists,
politicians, and grassroots movements. ENGOs in the Soviet bloc were part of the process of
environmental globalization. These organizations, similar to ENGOs in the United States, began
building transnational networks and devising programs with globally oriented goals. This
71
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becomes an important strategy for ENGOs at Stockholm and an important development in NGO
diplomacy in the early 1970s.
The Cold War
Development, Modernization, and the Cold War
The Stockholm Conference was a meeting to confer on the status of the human
environment and discussion about the condition of the environment often concerns the forces
that degrade it. As Mostafa Tolba, former director of the United Nations Environmental program
wrote, “The Stockholm Conference clarified the link between development and the environment
and suggested an approach that would recognize the socioeconomic factors behind many
environmental problems and cure the effects by treating the causes.”74 Therefore, in order to
understand the actions of the diplomatic actors in Stockholm, we must discuss the forces behind
the environmental perils that these agents faced.
Economic development has become an increasingly popular topic among Cold War
historians. Globalization is an important part of their narrative. Thomas Friedman writes in his
book The World is Flat that the world has gone through three different epochs of globalization,
of which the first two I will discuss here. Globalization 1.0, which he argues lasted from around
1492-1800, shrunk the world from large to medium. Essentially, countries were able to make
their world smaller through advances in technology and greater accumulation of capital.75
Globalization 2.0 lasts from 1800-2000 and notes the ability for private enterprises to become
part of globalization.76 The Cold War exhibited elements of the first two epochs for the United
States and private financial organizations, maintaining global reach and economic development,
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as historians have noted, was a method through which they exerted their power and sought to
protect their interests. In tandem with the focus on the Third World after September 11,
economic development has become an important topic in diplomatic historiography.
The ideological foundation of development, though it is commonly recognized as a Cold
War strategy, was established during the Enlightenment. This intellectual revolution emphasized
scientific thought and reason as the driving force behind progress and decision-making. As
historian Joe Hodge wrote in the case of the British Empire, “What made this ‘second’ British
Empire distinctive were the ideological currents of the Enlightenment. The doctrine of
improvement gave its adherents faith and confidence in their possession of new modes of
knowledge and new abilities to shape and manipulate nature to their will.”77 The ideological
components of development were not the only aspects of economic development to come out of
the Enlightenment. Rather, the Enlightenment taught that past errors could be corrected through
the use of science and reason.78 Therefore, out of the Enlightenment came programs in which
people thought could better their world. Many of the proponents of modernization theory and
development programs believed innovations in the scientific community would solidify their
position as lords over their domain and give them the ability to control the environment around
them.79 This Enlightenment notion of power translated well into a post-World War II setting.
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Social scientific and modernization policies drew from Enlightenment era ideas of western
superiority and fit them into a Cold War context.80
Between the eras of the Enlightenment and the Cold War, development fit into the
context of colonialism. First-world countries used development to show less developed colonies
how modernization should look. Furthermore, development was often forced upon these
societies.81 Development, in this context, was used as an appendage of empire. It served as a tool
to form international hierarchies and enlarge spheres of influence for the industrialized powers.
Rather than simply as a way to better mankind, it was a tool to emphasize Eurocentrism.
While many Cold War actors used modernization to assert their power, others noticed the
more noble aspects of development. The World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), and the World Health Organization (WHO), “helped to create a sense of an international
community and an obligation among its members to promote the well-being of the whole.”82
Proponents of modernization saw the benefits development brought in its ability to transform
agricultural processes and economic institutions and thereby help cure social ills. “Science could
give farmers the ability to grow enough food to feed the world’s population on a nutritionally
sound basis.”83 The FAO’s goal to renovate agricultural practices, as well as other programs by
other international organizations to eradicate global poverty and minimize the impact of diseases,
was founded by noble intentions but came with unintended consequences. “In focusing on the
end product – development – these international civil servants often overlooked the human
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misery and social disruption caused by industrialization.”84 Prominent among these
consequences was the destruction of the environment but in the Cold War, the preservation of the
environment took a back seat to the fight against Communism.
Development programs were an effective strategy used by American policy makers
during the Cold War. Michael Latham argues that modernization was a comprehensive response
to Communism.85 In areas such as Latin America, US policy makers believed that political and
economic instability invited Communism. Therefore, the United States initiated development
programs and encouraged liberal policies to deal with these potential problems. In this way, the
American empire was about political containment and market dominance.86 However, these
programs did not singularly attempt to promote America’s economic and political sovereignty
but also illuminated the role of America in the world that Americans constructed for themselves.
As Latham noted, “Johnson linked America’s global mission with the nation’s moral purpose.”87
Programs such as the Peace Corps sought to win the hearts and minds of the world’s people and
tip the balance in the United States’ quest for superiority and credibility. While these programs
aimed to benefit the image of the United States abroad, their actions in the Vietnam War
challenged their status as benevolent world leaders.
The Vietnam War
The Vietnam War had a significant impact on the role of the United States in the world.
After America’s experience in Korea, the Domino Theory88 became an intrinsic element of
diplomatic strategy. The war grew under the supervision of the Lyndon Johnson administration
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and dissent toward the Vietnam War persuaded Johnson to decline his party’s nomination in the
1968 election. As Richard Nixon entered office in early 1969, the war became a primary
component of his foreign relations platform and Nixon vowed to “end the war and win peace in
the Pacific.”89
What started as Johnson’s war, quickly turned into Nixon’s nightmare. The president
argued to the America people that the North Vietnamese represented “Communist
colonialism.”90 The idea that Soviet Communism was spreading represented justification for
American presence in Southeast Asia. The American people, as demonstrated during the Johnson
years, showed that they did not agree with that conclusion. The most public displays of dissent
were political protests. Public opinion polls show that the American people started feeling more
favorably toward demonstrators. Polls from 1969 show that 81% surveyed believed
demonstrators were asking important questions, 50% thought the Vietnam War was a mistake,
and 55% rejected Nixon’s characterization of anti-war protesters.91 Nixon was losing the support
of the American public for his war effort during the first year of his presidency but as the
Stockholm Conference grew closer; his escalation of the war further alienated the populace.
In 1970, Nixon began his Cambodia campaign and therefore showed his commitment to
winning the war in Vietnam. In response to the bombings in Cambodia, drastic events such as the
Kent State shootings, and the publishing of the Pentagon Papers, the American public reacted
with more protests and greater suspicion of the American government. “But there can be little
doubt that the outburst came because an unpopular war, that seemed to be winding down, was
suddenly and dangerously expanded.”92 The expansion of the war led to a greater number of
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Americans asking for a total military withdrawal from Vietnam. By 1971, 60% of Americans
favored a total withdrawal of American troops by the end of the year.93 By the start of the
Stockholm Conference in June 1972, an election year in the United States, the majority of
American people and the office of the presidency disagreed on what to do about Vietnam. The
American people were not the only population to voice their dissent about the Vietnam War. An
international community of protestors questioned the United States and doubted their role as a
leader at the Stockholm Conference due to accusations of ecocide in Southeast Asia. This stance
became problematic for the U.S. delegation, which nonetheless sought to use the conference as
an opportunity to reestablish itself as a benevolent leader in global affairs.
At the time of the conference, members of the U.S. counterculture were most critical of
the United States government and their position in world affairs. The counterculture was an
important development of twentieth century U.S. history but it is by no means a uniquely
American movement. These emerging activists from around the world emphasized the
Enlightenment ideal of autonomy and saw intertwined social movements as a medium through
which to get rid of war, poverty, and injustice.94 The counterculture was defined by two
important elements. First is their age. This group of people tended to be younger.95 The second
was the transformation of ideology. According to Ken Goffman, “Among leftists, and even
among some hippies, the new word was revolution … by any means necessary, and it grew from
a whisper to a shout.”96 Revolutionaries from the left sought to transform society and the UN
Conference on the Human Environment was an excellent stage to protest. The environment was
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often the victim of Cold War development strategies and the international socialist community
staged their protest the capitalist system in Stockholm in 1972.
Protestors and members of the counterculture movement that showed up in Stockholm
and governmental delegates had different goals and ambitions going into the conference.
Political debates surrounding topics such as the role of the United States in the world and the
aggressors causing environmental degradation shaped the approaches of these actors. The
Vietnam War and the counterculture politicized the conference and ENGOs sought to
disintegrate the ideological and geographical divisions between governments and concentrate on
concrete solutions they felt would protect the environment. Furthermore, the ENGO community,
as non-state actors, was often lumped in the same group as the counterculture members at the
conference. Understanding the approaches of state and counterculture actors is important in order
to understand the strategies, ideologies, and perceptions of the American ENGO community.
Presidential Politics of the 1960s and 1970s
The Administration of Richard Nixon
The foreign policy of the Nixon Administration is important in understanding the Cold
War and the Stockholm Conference. While Nixon sought to win the Vietnam War, it was
becoming clear that the United States could no longer be the unchecked police of global affairs.
However, the centrality of the United States was still important to the presidential
administration.97 To Nixon, the United States had to find a way to become the benevolent leader
of world affairs. According to Franz Schurmann, “Nixon was a master mover who used foreign
affairs to gain power, thereby to centralize executive authority.”98 Nixon, like Lyndon Johnson,
played power politics in world affairs. Policy initiated by the Nixon administration, even in
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multilateral agreements, sought to establish the United States as a leader through either practical
means or foreign perception.
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment fits within this narrative and
the efforts of ENGOs often were in response to the national goal of American leadership. While
the United States put forward a policy rooted in self-interest, ENGOs emphasized globally
oriented goals. This primary difference in the approach of the United States and American
ENGOs helps establish the non-state actors in the narrative.
Conclusion
Political, economic, social, and ideological developments shaped the world that
surrounded the conference. Delegates and non-state actors who attended the conference
confronted these issues and in turn, these issues influenced the worldview of the various
diplomats, official and non-official, present in Stockholm. The issues that have been addressed
through this chapter penetrated the walls of the conference and influenced the political climate of
the world in 1972. The pre-conference period (1970-1972), laid out the issues and concerns that
state and non-state delegates would address. While the next chapter will discuss the
institutionalized forums of discussion, the focus will be on the informal arena and the influence
of American ENGOs during this formative period of international environmentalism.
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Chapter 2:
Fighting for a Successful Conference
June 4th, 1972, on the eve of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
the New York Times published an article titled “Crucial First Steps,” appropriately titled to
welcome the first substantive discussion on environmental regulation. According to this article,
“In his years of planning and arranging the Stockholm gathering, Secretary-General Maurice F.
Strong has had to do some of the most delicate tight-rope walking, as well as some of the most
persuasive selling, done on the international scene in decades.”99 These words rang true as
geographic and ideological divides permeated into the formal and informal forums of discussion
leading up to the conference. Due to these divides, the Conference was in a position to fail.
American ENGOs wanted to the conference to succeed and measured success by the ability for a
conference to convene and produce substantial and specific policies concerning the human
environment. The four years leading up to the 1972 Stockholm Conference were full of
deliberations on issues such as pollution, population control, economic aid, whaling, governance,
education, technology, and ocean dumping. Government officials, scientific experts, and
engaged citizens came together to set the agenda for the conference but ideological, political, and
geographical divisions hindered their ability to cooperate. American ENGOs made these
divisions an important part of their approach to the conference. Therefore, the pre-conference
period tells much on the conference and how it was interpreted for decades after.
Formal and informal diplomatic agents prepared for the world’s first major international
conference on man’s relation to his environment in different ways, each trying to manipulate the
substance or tone of the Stockholm agenda. These groups asked fundamental questions regarding
environmental regulation, governance, the role of development, priorities of the environmental
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agenda, and the influence of the political climate on environmental negotiations. American
ENGOs, during the pre-conference period, contributed to the discussions on these topics and
made their voices heard on these issues. As Gareth Porter and Janet Brown stated, “Non-state
actors also exert major and increasing influence on global environmental politics,”100 and
American ENGOs used the pre-conference period to make themselves viable diplomatic actors.
In order to understand the impact of the activities of American ENGOs, we must
contextualize their efforts. To do this, this chapter will first address the efforts of the
international scientific community, the United States government, and briefly the other major
nations. The international scientific community101 put together two different meetings leading up
to the Stockholm Conference, one in Founex, Switzerland and another organized by the
Fellowship of Reconciliation. These meetings addressed the balance between the needs of
developing and developed countries and the balance between environmental perils and economic
agendas, which were important issues frequently discussed by American ENGOs. In addition,
this chapter discusses governmental action as ENGOs frequently conversed with the American
preparatory committees and the State Department. During this time, American ENGOs
frequently “lobbied or pressured their own or other governments to accept a more advanced
position toward an issue.”102
During the preparatory period, American ENGOs began to engage in formal and informal
diplomatic activities, which helped establish the foundation for their relevancy in Stockholm. As
the following pages show, these organizations aimed to bridge the myriad of global divisions that
100

Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics, 2nd Edition, (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1996), 31.
101
I use the term International Scientific Community as a term to discuss scientists who engaged in
international dialogue. Dai Dong and Founex, the two major scientific groups discussed within the context of the
conference, held diverging goals. The term here is meant to note the transnational discussion, used by experts, to
discuss the issues surrounding the human environment.
102
Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics, 54.

38

the conference illuminated. The globally focused approach maintained by American ENGOs
differs from the nationally focused program of the official American delegation and therefore
alters the American presence during the pre-conference period. Furthermore, their efforts created
additional room for political space in the international arena. The issue of the global environment
fashioned a convoluted political landscape, through which American ENGOs functioned in
formal and informal capacities. This chapter will not focus on specific policies though, as the
pre-conference era produced few specific policies, but rather, this chapter will address the
ideological foundations of, and rhetorical devices used during the planning stage of the
conference in Stockholm.
The two organizations that take primacy in this analysis of the pre-conference period are
the Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society. This is the case for a few reasons. First, both
were very active at the national level prior to the conference and created international programs
during the preparatory era. The transition from nationally to internationally focused programs
deserves special focus in the context of the environmental movement of the 1970s. Secondly,
The National Audubon Society was unique in the fact that its president, Elvis Stahr Jr., was the
only member of the official US delegation that represented an ENGO. Third, the Sierra Club was
maybe the most prolific communicator with the State Department’s Advisory Committee and the
Secretary General of the conference, Maurice Strong. The number of letters, memos, and
position papers stored in their archives testifies to their status among the American ENGO
community. Lastly, the National Audubon Society and the Sierra Club represent two of the most
established organizations at the time. The National Audubon Society represented the old-line,
moneyed interests and the Sierra Club was arguably the most recognizable name of the time.103
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The International Scientific Community before Stockholm
The international scientific community was one of the most active groups during the preconference period. During this era, scientists drafted several principles regarding the NorthSouth divide and the priorities of development and modernization projects around the world. The
two reports discussed here are the Founex Report, which came out of a meeting by scientists and
governmental officials in June 1971 and the Dai Dong Declaration, which was the culmination of
a meeting by scientists two weeks before the official U.N. conference. These meetings greatly
influenced American ENGOs as they served as important forums for issues critical to the success
of the conference. These reports are significant, both for contextualization but for also
understanding the issues American ENGOs thought to be important.
In June 1971, experts on the development process convened in Founex, Switzerland to
discuss an important problem facing environmental regulation, the North-South divide.
Developed and developing countries could not agree on the nature of environmental regulation.
Gerald Leach, a writer for the Washington Post said of the meeting,
Ask almost any environmentalist on the international circuit to name the most
significant political event of 1971 and as likely as not he will mention Founex, a
totally undistinguished village on the outskirt of Geneva… Founex happens to
possess an ugly motel where, last June, almost entirely unnoticed by the world’s
press and television, something happened that will give the town at least a large
footnote in world history. For two weeks a group of economists, scientists,
development specialists, and U.N. officials met in Founex’s motel to discuss ways
of convincing the poorer two thirds of mankind that pollution, resources and all
the other environmental problems facing the rich countries were their problems
too.104
The experts in Founex sought to sell the idea of global environmental regulation to developing
countries by bridging the divide between environmental and development interests. In their
report, they state that their main objective is to “draw pointed attention to the compelling
104

Gerald Leach, “3d World Warned on Pollution,” Washington Post , January 20, 1972.

40

urgency of the environmental problems that arise out of poverty, to the need for a new awareness
of the importance of remedial measures, and above all, to the need for reinforcing the
commitment, both nationally and internationally, to the development objective itself.”105 The
experts authoring this document felt that the causes of environmental degradation in the
developing world and the need for modernization projects stemmed from the same problem:
underdevelopment.106
Central to the beliefs of the Founex experts, was the common goal between
environmentalism and the goals of the United Nations Second Development Decade. In the
report put out by the scientists, economists, development experts, and United Nations officials, a
main argument made was that,
Major environmental problems of developing countries are essentially of a
different kind. They are predominantly problems that reflect the poverty and very
lack of development of their societies. They are problems, in other words, of both
rural and urban poverty. In both the towns and in the countryside, not merely the
"quality of life," but life itself is endangered by poor water, housing, sanitation
and nutrition, by sickness and disease and by natural disasters. These are
problems, no less than those of industrial pollution, that clamor for attention in the
context of the concern with human environment. They are problems, which affect
the greater mass of mankind.107
This approach differs significantly from the Friends of the Earth, which generally advocated for
decreased development because they believed that there could not be economic growth without
detrimental environmental effects.108 Though the Founex Report cited development as the cure
for the developing world’s environmental problems, several representatives from the developed
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world resisted a double standard in regards to environmental regulation and felt that it would
disturb the global economy.
Inconsistent levels of environmental regulation, developed and developing countries
argued, could significantly hurt global trade. The report stated that, “There is a fear that the
insistence of the developed countries on rigorous environmental standards of products exchanged
in international trade may well give rise to a ‘neo-protectionism.’”109 Without strict
environmental regulations in the developing world, prices for materials from those regions would
be lower and it would give an advantage to those countries. In return, representatives from
developing countries believed that, “Rich nations might discriminate unfairly against the
products of poor nations on environmental grounds.”110 In order to quell the harsh debate on the
effects of environmental regulation on international trade, the report recommended that,
“Potential economic frictions resulting from environmental improvements should be confronted
and negotiated through international trade organizations.”111 The overall Founex plan to save the
environment is similar to the proposals given by the United Nations Development Program to
one of the conference preparatory committees, recommending that several environmental
problems stem from the development process and can be solved by the development process, as
long as environmental problems are considered during the development planning process.112
Lastly, an important issue the Founex Report discussed was the issue of governance.
While ENGOs often advocated for increased international authority, the report disagreed.
Gladwin Hill, a prolific journalist on international environmental issues noted that,
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Another major obstacle that apparently was surmounted was the question of
whether local environmental problems, from ocean pollution to the preservation
of a vanishing species, call for the creation of some huge new regulatory agency.
The overwhelming consensus here is that these problems can be handled within
the existing United Nations structure.113
The Founex Report called for sovereignty and development and placed it at the center of the
environmental debate. The report found compromise between environmental and development
concerns and formed what The Guardian called a “sensible international strategy.”114
The Founex Report was significant in addressing the concerns of developed and
developing countries, which was an important issue for American ENGOs. Groups such as the
Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and the National Audubon Society knew that the North-South
divide would render the conference useless, if not addressed. This report, though it disagreed on
principle points with more ideological organizations such the Friends of the Earth, worked to
bridge some of the staggering gaps. The Dai Dong Declaration on the other hand, fit in well with
the agenda put forward by American ENGOs before the conference.
Dai Dong, a group sponsored by the Fellowship of Reconciliation,115 an international
peace movement, authored a declaration on the environment two weeks before the conference.
This organization, made of scientists from various countries but primarily the United States,
“attributed the environmental crisis to an ‘interaction between the social and natural systems on
this planet’.”116 In other words, this group believed the structure of the global system was at the
root of environmental degradation. In their declaration, authored just before the conference, the
group wrote, “It has become clear that a more rational distribution of industrial power is
113
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necessary if the global problems of environment and society are to be solved.”117 Dai Dong held
the belief that unequal distribution of wealth and power led to the exploitation of nations,
humans, and the environment.
While Dai Dong’s central argument was not well received by national delegations, their
declaration served as a symbolic critique of the world economic and social order. Jens Bröndom,
European director of Dai Dong contended that the representative structure of the UN made
reform unlikely,
“We feel there is an ecological imperative which demands fundamental changes
in the global political and economic structure. We believe that the U.N. delegates,
as members of sovereign states, will be inclined to defend existing governmental
interests. Therefore a voice that speaks for the necessity of such change must be
heard.”118
Dai Dong believed NGOs should be more prominent actors in world environmental affairs
because they could address environmental perils in a more internationally minded manner. In an
interview with Radio Canada International, Fred Knelman, the prime organizer of Dai Dong said,
Most of us have come to feel that the solution cannot be found within the
contemporary nature of nation states within the developed world, whether they are
communist, socialist, or capitalist. All of them are hooked on growth and the
imperative of power. All of them, in a sense are accentuating and perpetuating the
problems. So we feel that there has to be some gigantic, in effect world
reconstruction and reordering of society. So it will affect everybody, nobody will
win the battle against nature.119
The central goal of Dai Dong was not feasible in the short run as nation states were the primary
agents of diplomacy, but their de-emphasis on national delegations but rather growth of ENGOs
would be realized in part over the next couple of decades. The benefit of the Dai Dong meeting
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was that it addressed the issues without the “confines of official national postures.”120 American
ENGOs met in a similar way, a couple weeks later during the conference itself.
Overall, Dai Dong added significant provocation before the conference began. Dai Dong
argued, in contrast to the report submitted by the experts at Founex, that after the restructuring of
the global order, that the “use of… resources, however, should not be dictated by… geography,
but must be allocated in such ways to serve the needs of the world’s people in this and future
generations… The environment is an indivisible whole.”121 Their propositions stemmed from an
ideology similarly held by participants of the first Earth Day in the United States,
They realized that the unrestrained urbanization and industrialization
characteristic of the nation’s post-World War II economic boom mandated more
than the simple need to use natural resources wisely. It demanded a broader
protection for overall environmental quality, protection for the intrinsic condition
of the… air, water, and land. Expanding upon the tradition of Progressive-era
preservationists, these new environmentalists viewed the earth as an ecosystem
with humanity only a part, a part that nevertheless threatened the whole.122
The Dai Dong Declaration supported an internationalist view of the environment and placed
sovereignty as secondary to environmental preservation. Their findings though, they felt were
not confined to the context of the conference. They hoped that Dai Dong was the beginning of an
ongoing dialogue about the relationship between the global order and the international
environment.123 This declaration has significant consistencies with the positions taken by several
American ENGOs. The vast coverage Dai Dong received by the media was good news for
American ENGOs. The similarities between their positions, which will be discussed later in this
chapter, meant that Dai Dong furthered the ENGOs cause in Stockholm.
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State Actors before Stockholm
For the United States, the pre-conference era (1968-1972) was a contentious time in
domestic and foreign affairs. In 1969, the first Republican president since Dwight Eisenhower
took office. Richard Nixon won a tight election against Hubert Humphrey and George Wallace
after President Johnson decided not to run for reelection due to the unpopularity of the Vietnam
War. Nixon, burdened by Johnson’s war, escalated the conflict and increasing opposition
mounted against him domestically and internationally.124 Vietnam, in the context of the Cold
War, entrenched America’s commitment to the policy of containment. The Cold War intensified
the distrust between East and West and while Nixon’s Détente aimed to ease diplomatic tensions,
America still found itself in the middle of a powerful global conflict. World events became the
catalyst behind American foreign environmental relations. They emphasized the need for the
United States to become the leader of global environmentalism and protect its national interest,
namely economic growth in the Third World to protect against communism.
American government officials viewed Stockholm as an opportunity to assert governance
in another aspect of the global arena. Before the conference began, Nixon’s administration
believed America’s actions at the conference would perpetuate one of two perceptions
Americans had about him. Nixon’s supporters viewed him as a “self-controlled paragon of
conservative values and a wise defender of the national interests” and his opposition viewed him
as “an unprincipled scoundrel who abused the country’s democratic institutions.”125 Both
interpretations illuminate an important characteristic about the president. Nixon was a political
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realist in terms of foreign policy, meaning he believed in the ability for powerful countries to
manipulate world events and act in their self-interest.
The Administration aimed to project a positive image of itself on the international stage
to offset recent events that portrayed the U.S. negatively. The multilateral nature of the
Stockholm negotiations provided the United States a platform to project themselves as the
benevolent front-runners of environmentalism. Russell Train, the head of the U.S. delegation,
wrote in a letter to John Ehrlichman that, “International cooperation on environmental matters
constitutes a major opportunity for positive U.S. leadership in world affairs.”126 The Vietnam
War undercut the humanitarian image that the president sought and the doctrine of containment
was designed to engineer. Nixon sought to reshape America’s foreign relations and distance the
country from traditional policies. Nixon claimed that the policy of containment broke down with
Vietnam and the country must come to grips with the presence of China despite its communist
nature.127 Containment had long been the policy that influenced foreign affairs and Nixon
attempted to detach his presidency from that Cold War school of thought. Nixon visited China
with a spirit of good faith, something no president had done before him. While his visit was
beneficial to the image of the United States, the conference still provided a vital opportunity for
the presidential administration to rebuild the nation’s image internationally.
The administration prepared for this promising opportunity through participation in
international and domestic preparatory committees. An important aspect of Nixon’s foreign
policy decision making was that, “The most important decisions were made either by Nixon
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alone or in consultation with Kissinger”128 and “The theoretical design of the NSC system
required a clear hierarchical chain of command intended to protect the president’s time and
screen information carefully.”129 In effect, Nixon or Kissinger were not consulted unless a highly
sensitive issue came up. Nixon was absent from most of these environmental talks, and Kissinger
only weighed in on issues of nuclear sovereignty. Therefore governmental organizations
throughout the administration participated in the effort to develop policy for the conference.
Inter-Agency groups created for the Stockholm Conference proved to be essential spheres for
discussion among government officials.130 The domestic committees wrote the U.S. National
Report, which was submitted to the United Nations in 1971. This document was the framework
for the final position papers and policies.131
The U.S. National Report emphasized the primacy of development and modernization
projects and that environmental regulation, while important, should not hinder a country’s ability
to grow. The scope papers were subject to decisions made by international preparatory
committees as well. The committees formed by the United Nations voted on the issues that the
conference would address. The United States played a key role in these working groups. Russell
Train stated that, “The United States took the lead in preparing for the 1972 UN Conference on
the Human Environment in Stockholm, shaping agenda as well as final actions.”132 In the lead up
to the conference, the United States played an active part in determining the direction of the
conference. One area of interest to the United States was the relationship of development to the
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environment, which was no surprise, since development has long been a tool used to ensure
political and economic stability in Third World countries and a key strategy in Cold War foreign
relations. While development took several forms, delegations at the conference focused on
economic and industrial development as those that posed the greatest threat to environmental
interests.
The preparatory groups discussed pressing environmental issues along with the role of
development in world affairs. The committees separated the issues into three general areas:
human settlements, natural resources, and pollution and nuisances.133 These three areas covered
important aspects of development projects carried out by developed countries over the past
couple of decades. After World War II, the United States, as an extension of the Marshall Plan,
dedicated itself to rebuild Europe and the environment received damage from this endeavor.134
The committees focused on the environment in which humans interacted. Protecting the
environment became a way to make life better for humans. The U.S. National Report called for a
more efficient system to manage resources for the betterment of the country.135 The committees
sought to protect water, land, and energy reserves to protect the environment and to prevent nonrenewable resources from depleting. Pollution became an important issue in the discussions
before the conference. The issue was previously considered a disagreeable but tolerable price for
progress.136 The United States delegation came to terms that their economic growth outpaced
nature’s ability to renew itself and that pollution had dangerous consequences. Scholarly
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literature illuminated these consequences and thus the committees sought to correct decades of
neglect through the conference.
Throughout the course of the pre-conference era, some national actors were excluded by
the United States, which lobbied, for instance, against the participation of East Germany. The
United Nations adopted a U.S. proposed resolution that only allowing U.N. members and
affiliated agencies into the conference.137 The resolution admitted West Germany but excluded
East Germany. Upset by this decision, the USSR and Eastern Bloc boycotted the conference. The
Cold War therefore found its way into Stockholm. It is not clear whether the United States
sought to exclude East Germany with the intention of antagonizing the Soviets, as officials
claimed they wanted to find areas of cooperation with the Soviets, but either way, it destroyed
any opportunity to work with Russia and ease tensions through the environment.138 The issue of
nuclear testing, discussed during the preparation era, embodied similar Cold War tensions and
reveals the importance of historical context in environmental negotiations.
The United States made a deliberate effort to maintain nuclear sovereignty and the option
to use nuclear weapons despite the negative effects these armaments had on the environment.
Paul Harris and John Barkdull argue that state actors move independently of systemic and
societal factors and pursue their own preferences and interests.139 In the case of nuclear testing,
the United States moved away from environmental discourse and aimed to protect their nuclear
arsenal, the last resort in Cold War combat. The choice to address nuclear interests diverges from
the peaceful foundations of Détente and the spirit of the SALT I treaty, which was signed only
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three years before. Although different, Nixon’s actions at the SALT negotiations and the
Stockholm Conference do not contradict each other. The SALT negotiations limited the stockpile
and technology that the United States already possessed but a ban on nuclear testing would limit
the future of nuclear proliferation. Therefore, the Nixon administration emphasized preserving its
nuclear arsenal and sought to secure its nuclear capabilities.
The U.S. government was not unified on the topic of nuclear weapons testing. There was
considerable tension between the State and Defense Departments on the wording of their stance
on nuclear testing. The State Department submitted a statement for consideration that read,
“Meanwhile immense resources continue to be consumed in armaments and armed conflict,
wasting and threatening still further the human environment,” while the Defense Department
stated that, “Due to continuing threats to peace and security, immense resources are being
consumed in armaments and armed conflict, threatening still the human environment.”140 The
differences in language are subtle but the delegation’s decision to endorse the Defense
Department’s version illuminates important details about the delegation’s priorities. The State
Department emphasized the destructive nature of nuclear weapons, while the Defense
Department focused on the military and political struggles that made the weapons a necessity.
The historical reality of the Cold War influenced the delegation and encouraged them to oppose
nuclear regulations that limited U.S. defense options. The United States actively sought to
protect its interests in the conference, but despite its efforts, Stockholm also presented an
uncertain future as no politician or environmentalist knew for certain what would materialize out
of the conference.
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The conference highlighted growing environmental consciousness and sought to address
issues such as environmental responsibility and global governance. The motto of the conference
was “Only One Earth” therefore signifying that man was part master and part creature in relation
to the world.141 According to this idea, countries could no longer rule autonomously and
independent of environmental factors. The conference represented a world that could exist and
was cognizant of and responded to environmental crises in a globally responsible fashion. It then
signified a way to construct this new world. A multilateral conference served as a management
function in which to govern the global environment.142 The United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment symbolized the transition from national to global governance of the
environment. The conference was the beginning of a process aimed at ultimate global control of
the environment.143
The ideological underpinnings of the conference and the political realities of the
conference show contradictions. One-worldism, an idea that the spirit of the conference
advocated for, contradicted the ideology behind U.S. foreign policy objectives. The United States
sought to establish itself as the main anti-communist force during the Cold War and attempted to
do this through the Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon Doctrines. The U.S. sought to use the U.N.
as a forum for discussion that it could guide toward American diplomatic goals. The United
States interpreted Stockholm as an opportunity to assume leadership and protect national
interests rather than relinquish sovereignty.
Modernization theory argues that economic growth was an important aspect of deterring
a country from communism; therefore, strict environmentalism posed a threat to the United
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States’ interests in Third World. To America, Stockholm symbolized potential conflicts with
developing countries. American politicians interpreted development as an instrument used to
provide opportunities for all people to have a better life.144 Therefore, development was not the
antagonist to the environment, but rather an additional method to improve life on the planet.
Officials from the United States sought to improve their relationship with Third World countries
through development. The Nixon administration pledged to help developing nations cope with
environmental problems that arose out of industrialization and urban growth.145 Stockholm
embodied the possibilities of new relationships with Third World countries and future
commitments to the developing world. But despite these hopes and aspirations, it was uncertain
how much effect the conference would have on the future of the global environment.
The environment was in dire need of help in the early 1970s. Scholar Erwan Fouere
argues that environmental dangers loomed large in 1972, but the promise of international
cooperation could control environmental problems.146 The conference presented a viable option
for world leaders to address environmental issues, but the negotiations would not be without its
limits. A New York Times article argued that the conference would not be able to counter all of
the problems that people have predicted for the environment.147 The future of the globe was
uncertain to policymakers at the conference, but America’s future role in the world was also at
stake as governance, Third World relations, and the prospect of environmental security would all
play out in Stockholm.
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The pre-conference era before Stockholm presented the United States with an opportunity
to shape its image and position in world affairs. The preparatory committees allowed
policymakers to direct the agenda and discussion during the conference and establish itself as a
leader in environmental matters. Their position on nuclear testing and the admission of East
Germany into the conference embodied the Cold War tensions that surrounded the conference
and influenced the policies submitted to the United Nations. The U.S. goals for the future shaped
the actions of U.S. representatives during the pre-conference era. All of these factors fashioned a
conference that changed the way people perceived the environment and forever altered the
characteristics of environmental negotiations. American ENGOs often clashed with policies set
by the United States but as the following section shows, ENGOs often communicated with other
groups and sought to act as diplomatic brokers during the pre-conference period.
American ENGOs before Stockholm
The modern environmental movement in the United States emerged in several stages.
Even before the rise of these organizations, engaged citizens were active in the public policy
debate over the environment as the discussion found itself in the court of public opinion, not the
legislative arena. 148 Citizens became more interested in the environment and environmental
organizations became an outlet for activism. Leading up to the pre-conference period, American
ENGOs worked to make themselves relevant in the realm of national politics. Organizations such
as the Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society played instrumental roles in helping the
modern environmental movement gain momentum. During the 1960s and 1970s, these
organizations grew with an impressive rate,
Between 1960 and 1969, membership in established organizations increased as
Americans became aware of environmental problems and as these organizations
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became more aggressive about preservation and pollution. While interest was
raised in the years preceding Earth Day, a second surge of activity followed.149
Environmental activists condemned the post-World War II emphasis on economic development
due to its impact on the natural environment. By 1970, these activists questioned industrial
society and criticized unrestrained development.150
Environmentalism was not inherently American, numerous efforts on the environmental
front by American legislators, organizations, and the public, made Americans the most
experienced in environmental affairs in the developed world. The United States, by the
beginning of the conference, established an agency on environmental issues, passed the Clean
Air Act, and instituted the first Earth Day. The United States also had environmental
organizations such as the Sierra Club and National Audubon Society that had been working in
the field of environmentalism since the Progressive Era. Journalist Marshall Goldman wrote,
“For those of us who take pride in leadership, there will probably be some compensation in the
fact that the United States is till about five years ahead both in the dimensions of its problems
and in the public awareness of what is happening.”151 Furthermore, the developing world was
barely represented among non-state actors due to environmentalism’s scarce manifestation in the
Third World. According to Barry Commoner, “Environmental concerns are usually voiced by
whites,” by which he means the developed world.152 American ENGOs were some of the most
experienced organizations in environmental affairs and their efforts translated into a significant
presence in the pre-conference period.
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The chapter will focus on different ways through which American ENGOs, namely the
Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society, functioned during the pre-conference period.
These organizations served as part of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee153 for the
conference and deliberated policy goals within their organizations. Furthermore, they conversed
with the State Department and United Nations concerning the preparatory process and
participated in independent international and national conferences on environmental issues in
order to prepare for Stockholm.
In regards to ENGO relations with the United States government, these organizations had
a difficult time establishing their relevancy within this context. The structure of the conference
favored national officials, those authorized to speak on behalf of their governments.154 Due to the
structure of the Stockholm Conference, the preparation process marginalized non-state actors on
a national level. Roger Hansen, a notable environmentalist, criticized the Nixon administration
saying, “It seems that the environmental community has been excluded from the UN Conference
almost by design.”155 His frustration reflects the selection of delegates representing the United
States in the conference. Out of thirty-five delegates selected, only one represented an
environmental NGO. Claiborne Pell, a Democratic Senator from Rhode Island, echoed Hansen’s
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disapproval. He condemned the head of the delegation for not making a dedicated effort to
consult citizens and the private sphere.156
Criticism of nongovernmental exclusion from various national delegations was the focus
of several letters to the editors of the London Times and other major newspapers. Launcelot
Fleming, Dean of Windsor Castle, wrote to the London Times arguing for their inclusion,
“Current environmental problems are unprecedented and require unprecedented solutions…
Non-governmental groups should become decision makers with government representatives.”157
His sentiments reflected popular thought around the developed world. Political awareness and
activism was on the rise and NGOs provided citizens a way to interact with their government in a
meaningful way. Ralph Verney wrote to the London Times about non-state political inclusion,
“Any…government which is courageous enough to lead in this direction will have the widest
support of the nation.”158 The environment was an important topic to the public and exclusion of
NGOs meant the rejection of the community in policymaking. Nineteenth century historian
Alexis de Tocqueville’s interest group theory states that public interest groups advocate for the
true interests of the people. The national government’s exclusion of NGOs therefore meant the
exclusion of the people.
While the marginalization of NGOs during the preparation period did limit their official
participation, environmentalists and scientists did engage in other forms of debate. Scientists and
environmental pundits provoked the debates that preceded the UN Stockholm Conference.159 The
science community exchanged ideas and the government invited a select few to participate in the
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Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee for the conference. While the committee was an
official extension of the State Department, their influence in policymaking was minimal. The
National Report, which formed the foundation of U.S. policy, was published in 1971, a full year
before the advisory committee met for the first time in 1972. In effect, the committee was similar
to an unofficial forum for discussion among non-state actors but did not offer NGOs full
participatory status before the conference.
There is still much that can be learned from the Advisory Committee, though its effect on
the U.S. delegation was minimal. The advisory committee traveled to six different cities across
the United States including New York, Cleveland, and Denver in order to hear the concerns of
citizens, scientists, and ENGOs. The Sierra Club made an appearance and testified at all six
locations. The testimonies show a number of issues the Sierra Club was primarily interested in,
such as the priorities among development and environmental interests, clean air and water,
economic assistance to help developing countries adhere to new environmental standards,
pollution, urban affairs, and population growth. In the New York hearing, Patricia Rambach,
head of the Sierra Club’s New York office and organizer for the Sierra Club at the conference
stated in her testimony that, “It (the Sierra Club) is also deeply concerned that the final
declaration be one that identifies the highest goals possible for mankind. It should not be a
document merely recording the greatest common denominator of acceptance.”160 In this instance,
the Sierra Club shows noticeable consistency with scientists from Dai Dong by urging
internationalist mentality rather than conforming to national policy. In addition, the Sierra Club’s
stance on population growth urges policy that is for the betterment of mankind rather than what
is agreeable at the lowest level. Rambach, during her testimony, accused the current draft of the
160
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Declaration on the Human Environment of not taking population control seriously.161 Developed
countries, in the pre-conference era, failed to discuss population control substantively in order to
appease developing countries. The Sierra Club felt that if population growth could not be
controlled, adequate food supplies would plummet and industrialization would skyrocket.162
In March 1972, at the Denver session of the Advisory Committee, Brant Calkin, an
organizer for the Sierra Club in the Southwest, offered his testimony, which rather than
providing specific policy guidelines, presented the committee with a general premise through
which to form policy. Calkin preached, “Once hunger is abated, comes a resentment with the loss
of clean air and clean water and with the loss of wildlife and human cultural values.”163 His
statement was in response to the findings of the Founex Report, which found the development
process to take primacy over environmental regulation. Calkin’s experience in New Mexico,
according to him, related to the situation in the Third World. He characterized each as a region
craving development but argued that the environment should not be neglected in order to
produce industrial or economic gain. This statement represents policies advocated for by
American ENGOs through the Advisory Committee but their more ideological approach failed to
make its way into the official policy guidelines of the US delegation.
Though it is doubtful the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee had significant impact
on the US delegation, one can still appreciate the existence of a forum for non-state actors to
promote their views to the public and government officials. The Advisory Committee allowed
American ENGOs to share their positions and advocate public involvement in a very visible
manner. As Ross Vincent, a notable environmentalist, said about public involvement,
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What we need is informed public opinion. There’s a lot of pressure on the State
Department to close its policy making off from even this much of public input.
But the door has been opened a little, and I think we’ve got a steel-toed shoe in
the door.164
The testimonies of the American ENGOs at the Advisory Committee may not have immediately
influenced foreign policymaking, but their participation and the participation of numerous other
individuals certainly made an example of their relevancy in global environmental affairs.
To prepare for this entrance into the arena of global environmentalism, several American
ENGOs worked internally to prepare for deliberations in Stockholm. Furthermore, they
constantly communicated with the State Department and Maurice Strong, to encourage them to
embrace the concept of unity, rather than political, national, and ideological divisions. These
organizations, of which the Sierra Club will be the primary example, previously worked
extensively at the national level as they routinely labored to promote environmental efforts.
Derek Osborn, an environmental scholar and active member in several ENGOs wrote,
“Increasingly they (ENGOs) are involved within countries in shaping the environmental agenda.
They need to be equally involved internationally.”165 At this time, ENGOs hoped to be active in
guiding the legislative program internationally as they had been at the national level. Their recent
growth allowed them to connect issues of the local and regional environment to the international
level, “The environment can provide a rallying point and a focus of collective effort at all levels
of activity, in the home and locality just as in the great issues of world politics. The great issues
can inspire the small and local and lend them significance.”166 The ENGO efforts before and
during the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment provided a venue through
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which these organizations could legitimize international programs and energize their
constituencies at home.
During the preparatory period, Sierra Club officials dedicated a significant amount of
time and effort ensuring the conference was in a position to succeed. They felt the greatest threat
to the success of the conference was ideological and national divisions. Politics plagued the
environmental negotiations prior to Stockholm. After the 1971 meeting for the UN Economic
Commission for Europe, the Sierra Club wrote to Secretary of State William Rogers, “The Club
is upset at the discord which this political issue interjected into the 1971 meeting in Prague…
There is no sufficient reason to perpetuate Cold War political patterns into 1972.”167 The
political issue referred to here was that of universality. The Sierra Club was concerned that
incomplete global representation at the Stockholm Conference would result in weak
environmental proposals. In regard to this issue, the Sierra Club consistently urged the United
States to allow East Germany into the conference and avoid a Soviet protest, but their efforts
failed to evoke any support from the U.S. government. Similarly, the Sierra Club conversed with
Maurice Strong, the Secretary General of the Conference, to ensure their participation in
Stockholm. They notified Strong of their intention to participate in Stockholm, to develop a
stronger international program, and requested they be awarded two observer seats at the
conference.168 These documents are a few of many that display the communication between the
Sierra Club and the State Department and United Nations. It is clear that the Sierra Club sought
to ensure their presence at the conference and the success of the negotiations.
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In addition to the political divisions the Sierra Club attempted to bridge, the geographic
detachment that manifested into the North-South divide, the competing needs and agendas
between developed and developing countries. From the perspective of developing countries, an
important issue was that of national sovereignty. Bernando de Azevedo Brito, a Brazilian
diplomat and member of the United Nations Development Program council, argued that, “The
early call for inter-dependence, with its byproduct of a diminishing scope for the very concept of
sovereignty, which is so clearly associated with present environmental trends, can jeopardize
their (Third World countries) efforts to construct their own societies.”169 While Azevedo Brito
argued for sovereignty, particularly for the developing world, the Sierra Club held a different
position on the issue of sovereignty. Mostafa Tolba and Iwona Rummel-Bulska, both top
officials from the United Nations Environmental Program, explain that ENGOs “are often
important in urging governments to act but sometimes seek maximum results rather than
achievable provisions, to be followed in time by stronger ones, as the more conservative model
suggests.”170 Nationally devised environmental programs often must adhere to national policies
and interests whereas ENGOs often advocate for policies they believe will improve the
environment on a more macro level.
The Sierra Club monitored and carefully negotiated the North-South divide. Developing
countries requested that if environmental standards were to become a part of the development
process, that developed countries should increase aid levels to compensate for increased cost, an
idea which found little support from developed countries. Patricia Rambach sent a memo out to
Sierra Club officials stating this divide as one of the five major difficulties the planning process
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encountered and “an issue that the Sierra Club should watch closely especially with regard to the
UN Development Program activities and International Bank investments.”171 While the Sierra
Club’s stance on the level of environmental regulation differed from the approach of developing
countries, according to Rambach’s report, they hoped developed countries would meet
developing countries in the middle and increase aid levels. As the following paragraphs show,
the Sierra Club was often at odds with the State Department’s approach to environmental
negotiations, but the environmental movement, at this time, contained two important
characteristics that made ENGOs viable political agents in the post-war period. First, the
importance of dissent and second, that of encouraging public discussion.172 Both characteristics
of the environmental movement describe the actions of American ENGOs during the preconference period.
The final major efforts in which American ENGOs partook were environmentally
focused conferences in the early 1970s. These conferences were forums for American ENGOs to
express their views and prepare for the major conference in 1972 but more importantly to build
transnational and international networks among environmental organizations. Patricia Rambach,
in a letter to Sierra Club officer Eugene Coan, wrote,
In the next few months before the Stockholm Conference, it would be useful for
the Club to get in touch with environmental groups in other countries, especially
England and the Scandinavian countries, to urge them to put forward their views
on the Declaration. If this is of interest, I could put out a letter pointing out some
of the weaknesses of the draft and some of the points still at issue, so that the
groups would be guided in a similar direction to Sierra Club interests.173
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The Sierra Club, before the conference began, sought to manufacture a front representing
environmental organizations. As they found out during the conference, this goal would be
difficult to achieve.
The National Audubon Society was active in attending conferences during the
preparatory period. One conference they were active in was The Rights of Non-Human Nature
Conference. The emphasis the NAS put forward at the conference was the need to combine the
current environmental situation with the concept of rights,
We believe that there is now a pressing need for systematic interchange among
individual thinkers pursuing similar paths in different fields, for a shift of
attention to a more positive stage of inquiry, for collective discussion of the
advantages and dangers of utilizing the concept of “rights” in connection with the
contemporary ecological crisis, and for at least preliminary consideration of the
practical implications of the thesis of non-human rights.174
These pre-Stockholm meetings allowed ENGOs to discuss and formulate the path they
envisioned for a more environmentally friendly future. Conferences became so prolific that Elvis
Stahr Jr., president of the National Audubon Society, said “I’ve also been to (perhaps too) many
conferences on the environment.”175 These meeting became venues, outside of the official
forums of diplomacy for ENGOs to act in the international arena.
The Sierra Club was increasingly active in international and national conferences. One of
these conferences was the 1971 International Youth Conference on the Human Environment,
held in Hamilton, Canada. The emphasis the Sierra Club placed on the conference was the
growth of public discussion on the environment. Michael McCloskey served on the Board of
Directors for the conference and with the help of other organizers, formed Project Maristem.
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This project was a child of the 1971 conference and was a tour of major North American cities
and highlighted by youth-oriented public hearings on the global aspects of environmental
problems.176 The public hearing appear to be organized for two central reasons. First, because
official preparations for the 1972 conference occurred with little public input.177 And second, to
become forums for issues not covered in the Stockholm deliberations such as the role of
multinational organizations, population growth, and the role of NGOs.178 In addition to the
conferences attended by the Sierra Club, they also organized conferences to encourage public
participation. In March 1972, they organized a meeting called The Sierra Club Sponsored
Seminar on the UN Conference on the Human Environment. The Club wanted the meeting to be
a free public outreach event through which information on expectations and intricacies of the
conference could disseminate.179 Conferences became extensions of Sierra Club programs aimed
to encourage a key tenant of their public policy; public participation in the policy making
process.
Conclusion
American ENGOs were active during the preparatory period in establishing their
relevancy in international affairs. After decades of working at the national level, these
organizations saw the opportunity to elongate the reach of their constituency. These
organizations used conferences, advisory committees, and constant communication with official
diplomatic groups to make themselves visible in foreign affairs. Furthermore, through these
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venues, they acted as brokers in an attempt to quell the ideological and geographical divides that
threatened environmental negotiations.
Groups such as the Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society were active in
undertakings related to the Stockholm Conference in the years leading up to the meeting but they
were not the only groups active during those years. Groups like Dai Dong and Founex continued
the dialogue on issues such as sovereignty, development, and universalism, issues of great
importance to American ENGOs. Lastly, the tense relationship between the United States and
American ENGOs in the Stockholm era influenced how the conference materialized and how
historians and public policy experts would interpret the conference in years to come. The Nixon
administration primarily saw the conference as an opportunity for political gain and marginalized
NGOs, a direct contrast to the efforts exhibited by ENGOs, which advocated for the primacy of
internationally focused policy and greater participation from ENGOs and the public.
Furthermore, the pre-conference period brings to light the divisions that plagued the conference,
divisions that became a priority for ENGOs to address before and during the conference.
As the Stockholm meeting quickly arrived, official and unofficial diplomats prepared for
this important moment in world history. The Sierra Club wrote to Maurice Strong and requested
for an area of 100 square feet of wall space and 30 square feet of table space, on which to display
various printed materials and Sierra Club produced films.180 American environmental
organizations knew this was a moment to vie for their relevancy in world affairs. Over the last
few years, there had been a great deal of coordination between NGOs and the UN in order to
organize the Environmental Forum and they hoped to make a splash in Stockholm.181
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Chapter 3:
Fighting for a Declaration, a Voice, and Relevancy
Two months before the conference, the agenda of the conference was made public. Over
five hundred pages of preparatory committee reports outlined the issues the delegates planned to
discuss including human settlements, energy use, pollution, and whaling but omitting the
outstanding issues of population control and nonrenewable resources.182 Due to all of the
preparation made for the conference, delegates, environmentalists, members of the press, and
engaged citizens tuned to Stockholm to see if the pre-conference period produced any substantial
policy on environmental issues.
The U.N. Conference on the Human Environment convened from June 5 – 16, 1972 in
Stockholm, Sweden. Over one hundred countries met for the first major international forum on
the environment and related social issues. During this conference, as nations of the world met to
deal with the serious issues that faced the planet, the United States sought to assert itself as the
leader of the broader environmental movement.183 American ENGOs on the other hand
committed themselves to the production of a viable yet non-compromising declaration. The
atmosphere in world affairs at the time strongly influenced the actions, rhetoric, and policies of
the United States, other governmental actors, and the non-governmental communities. The
conference at Stockholm was a challenging time to various constituencies yet, in the words of
John Gardner of The Common Cause, also represented “a series of great opportunities disguised
as insoluble problems.”184
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American ENGOs hoped that they would find success at the conference. Prior to
Stockholm, environmental groups played a valuable role in the conservationist movement by
heightening concern of national and global environmental problems.185 These organizations
sought to advise and engage the debate on the human environment on an international scale as
they had on a national level. Success would not come easily though as they competed with the
interests of the developing world, Cold War politics, and priorities of the nation state. After the
experts at Founex released their report, it was going to be tough to advocate for environmental
issues to be considered as the primary aspects of development. Development served as an
important aspect of US foreign policy at the time. Through development programs such as the
Alliance for Progress,186 the US “reframed an ideology that resonated with the nation’s previous
Western expansion and overseas empire building, America’s own historical road to progress, and
their power to define and promote movement along it.”187 Therefore, addressing the harm of
development, advocating for smarter development planning strategies, and requesting scaled
back development programs would be a challenge. Economic growth meant different things to
different people and countries. For the developing world, it meant a more prosperous future, for
the United States, it was an important aspect of the nation’s ideological foundation. These served
as formidable challenges to American ENGOs in Stockholm.
In order to act as credible diplomatic agents during this monumental occasion, American
ENGOs occupied several roles in order to advise delegates, report on the proceedings, and
deliberate important issues. Members of these organizations served as delegates, observers,
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commentators, protesters, and educators. My argument in this chapter is twofold. First, I argue
that their service in these roles made these organizations more visible on an international scale
than ever before, thus helping to build the foundation for their entrance into the arena of
environmental diplomacy. Secondly, their efforts in Stockholm transformed the US presence at
the conference.
Delegates, members of the press, environmental activists, and international youth showed
up in Stockholm to become members of the developing environmental narrative of the world.
The imminent threat of a degraded environment encouraged nations to send prominent delegates.
E.J. Kahn of The New Yorker, in regards to the delegates, wrote,
The conference in Sweden is unusual itself in that it is not of scientists but of
nations – a hundred in all, at the latest count. Most of them, it is to be expected,
will be represented by Cabinet ministers (the United States will send Secretary of
the Interior, as well as eleven senators and congressmen). The eminence of the
delegates is almost wholly attributable to Strong’s having convinced many heads
of state that the matters to be discussed are of immediate and overriding
concern.188
Members of states though were not alone in Stockholm. Together, with the non-state actors, they
formed a conglomerate of ideas, strategies, and priorities concerning the human environment.
They acknowledged though, that this conference was only the beginning of the fight to preserve
the international human environment. In order to adequately discuss the conference, this chapter
will highlight the conference proper, the People’s Forum (or Folklet’s Forum), and the NGO
Environmental Forum. Within these activities, this chapter will focus on the efforts of the Sierra
Club, Friends of the Earth, and National Audubon Society as they served in different functions at
the conference and provide a holistic view of NGO activities in Stockholm.
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The United States at Stockholm Conference
The United States held a powerful position at the conference. The delegation guided its
agenda and discussion, which naturally favored American national interests. The United States
understood the power dynamics embedded in multilateral discussions. Observers of the
conference generally were more interested in the tangible results of Stockholm but appreciated
less the process in which international decisions are made and the politics that went into
obtaining a consensus.189 The U.S. delegation knew that initiatives agreed upon at the conference
were only recommendations that would be voted on during the regular sessions of the United
Nations. In a similar way, declarations made only served as guidelines for nations to abide by.
With this knowledge, the United States understood that any proposed initiative had to pass
through a U.N. vote, with the United States possessing a veto power.
The United States’ ideological foundation promoted self-interest but the US delegation
also promoted proposals that benefitted the human environment. In Russell Train’s address to the
United Nations, he stated that the United States top priorities were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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Permanent entity within the UN
$100 Million environmental fund
Regional cooperation
Strengthen monitoring and assessment of the global environment
Coordinating research
Support effective international action to help nations increase their
environmental capabilities
Creation of the World Heritage Trust
Support international agreement to control the dumping of wastes into the
oceans
Cooperative action to protect genetic resources and to protect wildlife
Support the establishment of criteria upon which national pollution standards
can be based
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11. The identification and evaluation of potential environmental impacts of

proposed development activities190
The approach of the United States was not simple. The US delegation balanced the needs of state
and the needs of the world. The delegation encouraged national sovereignty and a nation’s right
to grow economically but also insisted on measures aimed to help the human environment.
Many of the US proposals came to fruition. The Declaration on the Human Environment
contained twenty-six principles through which future environmental negotiations should be
based. According to John McCormick, the twenty-six principles can be broken up in five main
groups:
1. Natural resources should be safeguarded and conserved, the earth’s capacity
to produce renewable resources should be maintained, and non-renewable
resources should be shared.
2. Development and environmental concern should go together, and less
developed countries should be given every assistance and incentive to
promote rational environmental management.
3. Each country should establish its own standards of environmental
management and exploit resources as they wished but should not endanger
other states. There should be international cooperation aimed at improving the
environment.
4. Pollution should not exceed the capacity of the environment to clean itself,
and oceanic pollution should be prevented.
5. Science, technology, education, and research should all be used to promote
environmental protection.191
Of the twenty-six principles present in the declaration, ten were aimed at either balancing
development and environmental interests or establishing the primacy of development.192 The
principles broadly aligned with the United States’ proposals at the conference. Their experience
in environmental affairs and economic capabilities allowed them to negotiate effectively at the
conference. The American environmental movement in the 1970s was the culmination of almost
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a century long process rooted in the progressive era.193 The delegation fought for stricter
standards on pollution and resource management but primarily sought to protect development.
America’s Cold War interests further resonated in their final position on nuclear testing. After
adopting the Defense Department’s wording on nuclear testing, the United States stood firm and
argued that any change in their wording was unacceptable.194 The Cold War climate influenced
the positions the United States because development was an intrinsic part of US foreign policy.
Therefore, development took primacy during the conference and self-interest, rather than
environmental consciousness, shaped U.S. policy in Stockholm.
The United States’ goal of world leadership was primary to America’s representatives
and the United States, at times, was met with hostility. China and the USSR sought to establish
their positions in world affairs by aligning with Third World countries and boycotting the
conference when the U.N. General Assembly excluded East Germany. In addition, the United
States faced much opposition to its efforts in Stockholm from non-state actors. The press
coverage of the events happening outside the conference negatively affected America’s image.
The delegation faced resentment from Vietnam War demonstrators and a grandchild of Mahatma
Gandhi made a speech denouncing the colonial practices of the United States.195 Protesters
accused the U.S. of ecocide, or destruction of the natural environment, in Third World countries
due to their use of chemical weapons such as Agent Orange and condemned the exclusion of
East Germany from the environmental talks.196 Contemporary world events not only influenced
the formation of policy, but also served as the foundation for resistance against the United States’
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programs. Due to the controversial nature of the environment and the resentment against the
United States, the delegation stated that the United States would only participate in future
conventions that were consistent with their country’s objectives.197
Non-American state actors resisted U.S. proposals as well. Lesser Developed Countries
(LDCs) struggled against pollution standards advocated for by the United States.198 America was
not the only group aware of what enhanced environmental regulations could do to economic
progress. Third World countries resisted any type of ecological protocols, and China sought to
align with these resistant countries and become a leader in Third World affairs.199 America’s role
in the conference, while influential, was contested. The efforts by these actors, however, were
ultimately futile. The conference urged many national governments to develop domestic
environmental programs, although the programs were relatively diluted from what NGOs
advocated for in the pre-conference era.200
The United States’ agenda at the conference, while they still aimed to protect national
interests, called for stronger environmental initiatives. These included initiatives on clean water
management, preservation of natural resources during an era of increased urbanization,
conservation of living resources such wildlife and ecosystems, and energy resources such as
oil.201 While the delegation’s policies were embedded in self-interest, they were not separated
from the historical reality of a growing global crisis. The American delegation claimed that the
overall objective of the United States was to raise awareness of environmental problems and
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increase domestic and international capabilities to solve these problems.202 In the pre-conference
period, the United States confronted domestic environmental catastrophes, such as the Santa
Barbara Oil spill in 1969, and these disasters prompted a national response to address the
degrading environment. Similarly, international awareness was essential to the implementation
of environmental programs on an international scale.
Declarations and recommendations from the conference, however, did not legally bind
any participating country.203 LDCs and developed countries alike did not have to adhere to any
resolution made in Stockholm. Without the growth of environmental political structures
internationally, wildlife, oceans, air, and other environmental issues that did not adhere to
national boundaries could be negatively affected and hurt American commercial and territorial
interests. The U.S. delegation used this call for environmental awareness to establish itself as the
leader of world environmental affairs and entrench its domination in multilateral negotiations.
The United States attempted to romanticize the conference in order to elevate their image
in world affairs. Russell Train argued that the environment was, “not just a domestic issue but an
international one. There is an atmosphere of responsiveness to U.S. initiatives, which leads to the
idea of the U.S. as the rational leader.”204 The delegation used historical precedent, status, and
the image of American exceptionalism to construct rhetoric surrounding the conference. The
Nixon Administration used public relations to advocate for America’s role as the leader of the
conference. Delegates, when interviewed, were instructed to tell reporters how Nixon’s
environmental initiatives had won him worldwide recognition in the field of
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environmentalism.205 Delegates used Nixon’s environmental agenda to justify America’s status
in the conference. Pro-American rhetoric was used in the argument in favor of implementing the
World Heritage Trust, the international version of the National Park Service. John Whitaker, the
Assistant Domestic Advisor for Environmental Affairs, argued that the world needed to “Pick up
the uniquely American idea of setting aside parks and other land for conservation.”206 America’s
status as the most eco-conscious country in the world served as justification for their leadership
during this transformative time in history.
When rhetoric did not justify their leadership, money served as an appropriate alternative.
One of the programs that the delegation argued for was a voluntary fund, which the U.N.
Environmental Program could use to support environmental initiatives around the world. In order
to encourage the participation of other countries and establish their leadership, Nixon pledged to
provide forty percent of a one hundred million dollar fund over five years.207 Although others
claimed otherwise, political scientist Stephen Hopgood argues that this fund was not created to
entrench U.S. domination in world environmental affairs but rather as a simple gesture to help
fund environmental programs.208 It is unclear to decipher Nixon’s intention but it is clear that the
United States used the fund as economic justification for their leadership at the conference and
world environmental affairs.
People’s Forum
The People’s Forum (or Folket’s Forum or Life Forum), was an additional quasiconference that took place in Stockholm during the UN meeting. This forum primarily comprised
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of international youth, far left-wing activists, and radical environmental organizations. These
constituencies met to bring light to a number of issues such as American ecocide in Southeast
Asia and issues not discussed at the conference such as biochemical warfare. Overall, the
Folklet’s Forum aimed to rally public opinion around the issue of imperialism that they felt was
at the root of the present environmental crisis.209
The activists at the People’s Forum sought to bring awareness of environmental
destruction in the Third World and connect it with the process of imperialism. Members of the
forum asked questions such as, who were the victims of environmental destruction, who
benefited from it, and what was the connection between environmental problems and social and
cultural factors?210 While the US condemned these questions as attempts to politicize the
conference, the activists of the Life Forum successfully began to create the link between
environmental degradation and social justice. In the same strain as the members of Dai Dong, the
People’s Forum discovered abuse in the social, political, and economic infrastructures of the
world and advocated for their alteration.
The meeting of the People’s Forum itself took place at several locations across the city.
While the center of the People’s Forum was located at a hog farm just outside town, the members
of the Environmental Forum allowed the People’s Forum to use some of their facilities. At
Cardet Field, one of the Environmental Forum facilities, the People’s Forum arranged a series of
speakers to discuss various environmental and human rights topics. Native Americans of the
Black Mesa plateau came to discuss the exploitation of their environment by outsiders, anti-war
activists spoke about the war in Indo-China, and various speakers debated the dangers of rising
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world population.211 The speeches given by the members of this forum weaved the narrative of
environmental destruction with the processes of colonialism, capitalism, and militarism. All of
which, they would argue, are destructive to the survival of mankind.
The Folklet’s Forum, while the least organized out of the three major conferences
occurring simultaneously in Stockholm, did possess guiding principles outlined by its speakers.
First, they felt militarism was a destructive force.212 They called for peace and immediate
resolution in Southeast Asia. Second, they called for the transformation of social and economic
lifestyles of nations.213 This spoke to the economic institution of capitalism and racial hierarchies
that formed because of colonialism. Lastly, they called for the interdependence of all
resources.214 They believed natural resources belonged to the world. Furthermore, they believed
that nature should not be abused by anyone regardless of national boundaries. While the
Folklet’s Forum was characterized as a more radical approach to environmental preservation, its
ideas were not novel, as they were in line with the ideological strain promoted by the members of
Dai Dong.
One instance of the People’s Forum’s reach at Stockholm was the effort of Greenpeace
during the conference. Irving and Dorothy Stowe in British Colombia founded Greenpeace in the
1960s. Originally, the organization focused on anti-nuclear campaigns before focusing on
environmental issues.215 Greenpeace worked on anti-nuclear testing during the lead up to the
conference and made it their primary issue in Stockholm. During the conference, members of
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Greenpeace went door-to-door, educating people about the dangers of nuclear testing.216 Nuclear
testing was fought by several developing world governments but ultimately did not make it into
the declaration. Greenpeace felt that their efforts made the issue a hot topic among the delegates
and raised awareness among the nations of the world.217
The Folklet’s Forum represents a prime example of what Paul Wapner calls “world civic
politics.” This is the notion that activists work across societies and with other activists and
organizations in order to indirectly pressure states into acting.218 The members of the People’s
Forum comprised of primarily American and Swedish youth, which in a moment of transnational
activism, pressured the United States to respond to their demands. As noted before, the United
States delegation denounced the political tone used by the youth. Nonetheless, the ability for
activists to get together in protest provides a pristine example of Wapner’s principle.
The international youth served as one example of non-state actors working in Stockholm.
Organizations such as the Sierra Club (SC), the Friends of the Earth (FOE), and the National
Audubon Society (NAS) undertook several efforts in order to raise awareness of environmental
issues and manipulate the discourse on the human environment. While these organizations were
considered more mainstream to the conference delegates, their effect on policy was minimal.
Still, their efforts and documentation bring a new light to interpret the major international
conference in Stockholm.
ENGOS at the Stockholm Conference
Non-state actors suggested more idealistic propositions for the conference. Included in
these propositions were the mandate for environmental impact statements from nations,
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international organizations, and multinational corporations, the creation of a global monitoring
network for pollution, and an international effort by all nations to assess the impact of population
growth on the environment. 219The Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee focused on
environmental enterprises that the United States could champion. The committee proposed that
the United States offer more aid to cultivate environmental projects within broader development
initiatives.220 The advisory committee placed primacy on the deteriorating environment rather
than economic development. The committee did not ignore development but they argued that the
fragile state of the natural environment deserved the delegation’s focus.
NGOs gathered in Stockholm and held a parallel conference alongside the official
meeting and the People’s Forum to voice their recommendations.221 The three conferences
represented various levels of diplomatic activity. The official conference served as the official
dialogue of the United Nations, the Environmental Forum acted as a quasi-conference and was
loosely sponsored by the United Nations, and the People’s Forum proceeded as a meeting of
citizen activism with no ties to the official meeting. Over four hundred NGOs participated in the
parallel environmental conference.222 The parallel conference was designed to divert non-state
actors attention away from the conference, in an attempt to minimize their attention to
controversial issues discussed at the official conference.223 The parallel meeting, endorsed by the
United Nations, initiated a tradition of NGO conferences that meet concurrently with U.N.
talks.224 The official conference marginalized NGOs but non-state actors found a forum in which
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to present their recommendations and argue for an idealistic program to protect the world
environment.
The Sierra Club was an active member of the Environmental Forum and through their
archives, a clearer picture of the forum appears. As journalist Philip Shabecoff noted,
Stockholm was the first major foray by the environmentalists into the treacherous
arena of international politics. The ability of the environmentalists and their allies
in the nongovernmental community to arouse public opinion gave them a
permanent role in the politics of international environmental policy-making after
Stockholm.225
This was a key turning point for environmental organizations and the Sierra Club ensured their
visibility during the pre-conference period. The Sierra Club was active, participating in the
Environmental Forum, serving as an observer at the conference proper, and rallying public
opinion domestically. The Sierra Club provides a meaningful look into the official and
tangentially related activities of the conference.
The Swedish UN Association and the National Council of Swedish Youth organized the
Environmental Forum, with sponsorship from the United Nations, with the intention of providing
a platform for an open an unconstrained discussion about environmental problems.226 The
Environmental Forum was precisely what Dai Dong called for in its declaration. The Forum
expected around 3,600 visitors and lined up prominent speakers such as Anna Erlich, Margaret
Mead, and Barry Commoner. Additionally, majority of the participants originated from Sweden
or the United States.227 The Forum amply represented the developed world but failed to represent
the developing world adequately. The forum comprised of lectures, movies, and exhibition halls.
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The majority of forum activities took place at the Cinema House, Cardet Field, and the National
School of Arts. The quasi-conference failed to produce any alternative declaration but rather
served as an arena for uncensored discussion and transnational cooperation.
At the Environmental Forum, the Sierra Club showed films, maintained an exhibit with
published materials, and hosted two workshops. The films they showed included Oil Spoil!,
Miner’s Ridge, The Redwoods, West Chichagof, Follow the Wind to Cousin, and No Room for
Wilderness.228 These films garnered high attendance from activists and spectators. In addition to
the films, they hosted workshops on marine pollution and environmental law, and conservation
of wildlife and natural resources.229 The workshops they held were in the style of a roundtable in
which experts discussed these issues from a purely environmental perspective. The exhibition,
films, and workshops illuminate an important priority for the Sierra Club at the conference,
environmental education. Their resources served as important mediums through which people
could become acquainted with environmental realities undisturbed by political jargon.
The Sierra Clubs’ to educate the public about the environment and the Stockholm
conference extended beyond the Environmental Forum. The Sierra Club coordinated with the
Zodiac News Service, an alternative news agency, to distribute news about the conference to the
American public. This strategy is similar to an endeavor taken by the Friends of the Earth during
the conference. The Zodiac News Service distributed information to radio stations throughout the
Bay Area and to over 200 small market stations nationally.230 An important issue in these
releases was the issue of whale hunting. The United States proposed a ten-year moratorium on
whale hunting which also received support from Western European and Scandinavian countries
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but Japan opposed the proposition.231 This strategy, while implemented on a small scale, allowed
for members of the US public to receive information on the conference from an NGO
perspective.
Lastly, the Sierra Club functioned as an observer at the conference proper. Eugene Coan
was the Sierra Club’s delegate at the conference. He reported on conference activities to the club
and discussed important issues to the delegates such as ocean dumping, whale hunting, and
additionality; the concept of increasing aid levels to accommodate new environmental
regulation.232 He also recommended specific action in order to combat any problems that arose.
For example, the United States advocated for the creation of a UN environmental fund not to
exceed 100 million dollars but opposed the issue of additionality in regards to increasing aid
levels. In response to this development, Eugene Coan sent a message to Sierra Club headquarters
stating, “We must start a major campaign in Washington on additionality.”233 The Sierra Club
knew that without additionality, LDCs would not sign on to strict environmental protection.
Therefore, their observer status allowed them to monitor conference activities and respond to any
threats to the proposed declaration.
The observer status also allowed the Sierra Club to discover the conference’s view of the
role of NGOs. Coan reported that on the first day of the conference, Maurice Strong stated that
“were it not for the NGOs and citizen groups, the conference would not have been held” and that
“the new dynamic relationships between these organizations and the UN which has grown out of
this conference.”234 Maurice Strong admired the NGO community and conversed with them
throughout the preparatory and conference periods. Observer status at the UN allowed the Sierra
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Club to see the plans the UN had for the NGO community, and it looked bright, despite their
relative marginalization during the conference itself. From the top of the conference hierarchy,
the influence and work of the NGO community were recognized.
The Friends of the Earth, in addition, were a major player for the NGO community.
David Brower, its founder, was active in the Sierra Club for several years but felt the Sierra Club
and other environmental organizations were not resisting governmental pressures to accept wise
use policies strongly enough.235 Their primary gift to the conference was the creation of the first
environmental newspaper, Stockholm Conference Eco. This newspaper chronicled all of the
activities of the conference but primarily educated the reader on the evolution of the declaration
and participation of NGOs in the diplomatic process. The newspaper was distributed to delegates
and member of the press for free and available for purchase by spectators. Before an adequate
discussion on the impact of the newspaper can commence, the political positions of the Friends
of the Earth must be discussed in order to understand the newspaper’s editorial ideology.
Friends of the Earth was one of the few American based international NGOs of the time
and was a more left-wing environmental organization. After the conference, the organization
published a book titled Only One Earth: Introduction to the Politics of Survival. This book
outlined their policies on a range of issues. Their positions show several differences with the
priorities of official government delegates. Their ideological position influenced the articles and
editorial capacity of the newspaper.
The Friends of the Earth, in their book, wrote about issues such as international
governance, air pollution, forest management, and resource consumption. Among these topics, a
consistent ideological strain exists. They argued that man must become more efficient and
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responsible with what it can manage and learn to leave some aspects, which it cannot manage
alone. In regards to forest management, they stated that, “forests can survive without managers
but not without guardians.”236 Similarly, in response to resource consumption, they argued that
as a species, man consumes and extracts too much and to combat this, mankind must let nature
preserve itself or mankind must invoke stronger regulations to prevent overuse.237 In order to
guard and manage these resources, they argued for greater international governance housed in
the United Nations and other international bodies.238 The Friends of the Earth’s ideology
diverged from the United States’ approach in two fundamental ways. First, the Friends of the
Earth emphasized the inherent value of natural resources compared to the value of natural
resources to humans. Secondly, it emphasized on international governance rather than national
sovereignty. ENGOs were skeptical of environmental deliberations within the confines of the
nation state and believed international bodies could protect the environment more effectively.
Stockholm Conference Eco emphasized the ideals of the inherent value of the
environment and the primacy of international governance in environmental management. While
the articles recited facts, the tone of the documents reflects a sense of frustration. The newspaper
traced the entire journey of the declaration, from proposal to final product. During the first day of
the conference, the newspaper commented on the geographical divisions that threatened the
declaration. While Japan, Canada, the UK, and Sweden, part of the committee on environment
and development, approved of the draft declaration, Algeria denounced capitalism, imperialism,
and racial discrimination.239 The developing countries felt that if these issues were not addressed,
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they could not approve the declaration. Due to these ideological divisions, the vote on the draft
declaration was postponed from June 7 to June 13.
On June 10, nuclear testing, one of the most hotly debated topics of the conference, was
discussed. According to Stockholm Conference Eco, Duncan MacIntyre of the New Zealand
delegation delivered a passionate speech condemning French nuclear testing.240 Major world
powers though, would not allow a discussion to commence on nuclear testing since it was vital to
their security and tabled the discussion.241 The newspaper criticized the national delegations for
focusing on national interests instead of the fate of the international environment. As the
conference continued, the declaration seemed to be lost. The draft declaration was sent to a
closed working group with the objective to produce some compromise. Since environmental
problems in the developed and developing world stem from different sources, a US delegate
suggested that the group only discuss common problems.242 This suggestion meant that the group
should only discuss issues that do not include development or industrialization, thereby severely
weakening the declaration. The Chinese delegation made matters worse for the declaration. As
they sought to obtain leadership of the Third World. The Chinese delegation came out with a
declaration condemning capitalism and imperialism and encouraged Third World countries to
make amendments on these issues.243 This political move sidetracked environmentally focused
negotiations and turned the conference into a meeting on human rights. The declaration seemed
doomed and the years of negotiations would be pointless.
On the second to last day of the conference, Stockholm Conference Eco published an
article on the resurrection of the declaration. The United States threatened that if a compromise
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was not reached, there would be no declaration. Soon after, the committees began to pump out
principles. It is unclear what compromise each side had to make, but the newspaper stated that it
“took a great deal of arm-twisting”244 to reach an agreement. While scholars generally cite this
conference as a moment of “political consensus,”245 Stockholm Conference Eco shows that
political, ideological, and geographical divisions plagued the conference and sincerely threatened
the existence of the declaration.
Lastly, Stockholm Conference Eco adequately covered aspects of the Environmental
Forum and other ENGO activities. The newspaper advertised lectures at the forum such as Paul
Erlich’s talk titled, “Population: The Skeleton in Stockholm’s Closet.”246 The newspaper also
criticized the forum for engaging with, and taking elements from the People’s Forum. They
accused the forum of containing Marxist monologue and lacking in two-sided debate on the
environment.247 The instance the newspaper refers to is Barry Commoner’s talk at the forum,
discussed by Michael Egan in his book about Commoner,
A peace among men must precede the peace with nature… But Commoner also
rejected the argument that environmental issues were so innocuous that they
served to divert people from more serious, controversial issues, insisting that, “as
a political issue, environmental protection is neither innocuous nor unrelated to
basic questions of social justice”…He equated environmental hazards with
obstacles relating to social progress.248
The Friends of the Earth maintained that some of the speakers, including Commoner,
were politicizing the conference to an exaggerated extent instead of finding solutions and
avenues through which to protect the environment. This is an important aspect of the
Environmental Forum. Though the ENGOs were labeled under a single category, it did
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not mean that they lacked ideological divisions as well. In this case, they are plagued by
some of the same diseases as the state actors. The main difference is in their international
focus compared to the government’s national focus.
While most of the ENGO activities took place outside of the conference, one
important figure, Elvis Stahr Jr., partook in the activities of the official meeting. Stahr
was the president of the National Audubon Society and the only member of the thirty-five
member delegation to represent an ENGO. In this regard, his experience is unique from
the other delegates and organizations. The National Audubon Society, therefore, provides
special insight into the workings of the conference.
Stahr was named head United States’ delegate for several subcommittees during
the conference. He was named head delegate for the committee on conservation
conventions and proposed the creation of the World Heritage Trust and a convention on
endangered species. He encouraged nations to sign the Wetlands Conservation
Convention draft and elected to defer a convention on Islands for Science.249
Additionally, he aided the head delegate for the subcommittees on environmental aspects
of natural resources and development and environment. He stated that their greatest
achievement was the adoption of the ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling, which
was only voted against by Japan, South Africa, and Portugal.250 The committees Stahr
participated in ran relatively smoothly for a divided conference. Stahr later praised the
conference and stated, “In the view of experienced United Nations observers, this was the
most tightly organized, best managed conference in recent UN history.”251 The reports of
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the Friends of the Earth and the National Audubon Society show that the conference was
well organized and the issues were broad but divisions also threatened and stalled
negotiations on the environment. Participation of ENGOs in several facets of the
conference gives a new nuanced view of international environmental negotiations.
Conclusion
The Stockholm Conference provided an opportunity for the United States to establish its
position as the pioneer of global environmentalism. The delegation’s emphasis on the primacy of
development and nuclear sovereignty signifies self-interest as the foundation of their approach.
While the United States sought to dominate the discourse at the conference, they encountered
resistance from, in particular, NGOs, LDCs, Vietnam protesters, and China. These actors
questioned and contested the policies and processes, which the United States promoted in
Stockholm. America acted with self-interest but also responded to the looming environmental
crises of the time and used its position to establish itself as a leader in the conference and broader
environmental movement.
ENGOs at the conference on the other hand obtained more internationally focused goals
and served in a variety of roles during this new moment in environmental political history. These
organizations served as commentators, activists, advisers, delegates, and educators. Their ability
to organize and become visible on an international level represents a new era for environmental
organizations. One should not overstate their presence though. One delegate for the US
delegation stated in an interview, “Everyone was so terribly concerned that the United States
might be embarrassed about Vietnam and what we’ve done to its environment” and they did not
like it that “State was pulling the strings. Whenever something difficult, like weapons testing or
ecocide came up, we were told to discourage discussion because it might make the United States
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look bad.”252 The journalist of the article wrote that the conference would better be titled “Only
One Foreign Policy.”253 Though non-governmental actors were generally excluded from most
official forums of decision-making, they practiced diplomacy in several other unofficial
capacities. These forums of instruction and deliberation were where American ENGOs vied for
their relevancy in Stockholm. After the conference adjourned, nations brought proposals back to
their federal governments, other international bodies, and the general assembly. While the
conference produced some real results, the idealism of the pre-conference period failed to
translate to the post-conference era.
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment represented a major turning
point for American ENGOs. The strategies utilized by these organizations mirrored tactics used
on the national level. These groups made an impact on the environmental debate by raising
awareness. The Stockholm Conference occurred during an important moment in the history of
these organizations. As the number of international organizations grew and national
organizations began implementing international programs, this conference was their first major
foray into the world of international environmentalism. After the conference, transnational
organizations began working to disseminate an ecological sensibility throughout the world.254
Now, with experience in the international arena and the organizational infrastructure to face the
global environmental debate, American ENGOs headed into the post-conference period with the
determination to make significant change on the international level.
The actions of American ENGOs in Stockholm hold much significance. Gilbert Rist,
notable scholar on the history of development, notes that NGOs rose in world affairs during the
time of structural adjustment and growing neoliberalism of the 1980s. International financial
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organizations maintained a greater role in the process of economic development and
nongovernmental organizations were designed to give the new order a “human face.”255 While
environmental organizations played a greater role in the foreign affairs process in the 1980s and
1990s, their roots in world affairs can be traced back to the Stockholm Conference.
Organizations transformed their infrastructure to accommodate international programs,
conversed with the State Department and the United Nations, and educated the public about
international environmental affairs. Their essential period of growth was in the 1980s but they
formed the foundation of their engagement with world affairs and vied for their relevancy as
diplomatic actors in Stockholm.
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Conclusion:
Fighting for the Earth
The Stockholm Conference was a new moment in the history of environmental politics.
David Twining, a political scientist, wrote of the conference, that it was “the first
acknowledgement by the community of nations of new principles of behavior and responsibility
for the global environment.”256 The conference served as a symbolic declaration to take
progressive steps to preserve and protect the human environment. Novel environmental
consciousness was not the only goal of the conference though as delegates hoped to implement
real environmental regulation after the conference adjourned. This goal, as state and non-state
actors would soon find out, would not come easily. Some actors from Stockholm, such as the
U.S. delegation, focused on maximizing public relations potential, whereas ENGOs and some
nation states were focused on the environment and helping the Stockholm Conference succeed.
As the conference and pre-conference exhibited as well, the post-conference era displayed the
diverging responses to environmental regulation.
The post-conference era presented a challenging time for U.S. delegates, politicians, and
Nixon administration officials. The delegation achieved many of its objectives and projected a
favorable image of the United States, but the future of global environmentalism was still
uncertain. After Stockholm, the United States conducted a public relations campaign to publicize
its accomplishments to the world. While the United States made a deliberate effort to improve its
image, it was inevitably hurt when many of their proposals did not come to fruition such as the
moratorium on whaling and initiatives on aimed to slow population growth. Due to the
unfulfilled promise of Stockholm, the delegations reconvened in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 to
discuss the environment and development. The United States during the post-conference era
256
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attempted to take control of its image, but political circumstances limited their ability to relay a
positive story.
A key strategy for the United States after the conference was to inform the public about
their accomplishments. Nixon, in a memo to Russell Train, wrote, “There needs to be an
emphasized effort to inform the public about Stockholm.”257 Nixon called for a public relations
campaign to highlight the United States’ role in the conference. In addition to relaying America’s
contribution, the campaign aimed to project Nixon’s personal involvement in Stockholm. John
Whitaker wrote to John Ehrlichman, “We need to hold a press conference to make sure the
president’s role in the conference is recognized.”258 The driving force behind the post-conference
public relations campaign was the 1972 presidential election. While Nixon did not play a large
role in the conference, as his attention was focused on China, his administration played a
dynamic role in shaping Stockholm.
The rhetoric of the public relations campaign emphasized the leadership role of the
United States but accentuated the goal of global unity. Nixon considered the international
environment to be an extension of America’s national objectives.259 This message was the central
theme of Nixon’s post-conference media campaign. This message resonated with domestic and
international audiences. The United States discovered an area upon which it could build a new
positive image in the world. Along with the idea of global unity, the administration emphasized
its role as the conferences leader. Train reported to Nixon, “The conference was a huge success,

257

Letter, Richard Nixon to Russell Train, June 17, 1972, WHCF: Subject: FG 6-17: Box 1: Folder 8,
Council on Environmental Quality Papers, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA.
258
Letter, John Whitaker to John Erlichman, June 18, 1972, WHCF: Subject: FG 6-17: Box 1: Folder 8,
Council on Environmental Quality Papers, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA.
259
Letter, Richard Nixon to Russell Train, June 17, 1972, WHCF: Subject: FG 6-17: Box 1: Folder 8,
Council on Environmental Quality Papers, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA.

92

the U.S. played a strong role and attained almost all of its objectives.”260 The sense of victory the
U.S. officials felt after the conference became a focal point of the campaign. The sentiment was
mirrored in Nixon’s presidential address on the conference, which he said, “I am proud the U.S.
is taking a leading role in international environmental cooperation.”261 The dual idea of
leadership and unity was the central focus of the public relations campaign after the conference.
Domestic recipients of the message heard of their country assuming a leadership role while
international viewers perceived a country far from the colonial power they experienced in
Vietnam.
Despite the Administration’s attempt to remake its image, any action would be limited
due to the shortcomings of the conference. Political roadblocks prevented the conference from
achieving all it was set out to do.262 National and corporate interests prevented many reforms
from being implemented and the infantile nature of global environmentalism led to inefficiency
in global governance by the United Nations Environmental Program. Aspects of the conference
led to weakened proposals. The USSR and Eastern Bloc countries ignored many of the proposals
due to their absence at the conference.263 A divide between the East and West on environmental
issues hindered the prospects of the conference and created a further division in the context of
the Cold War.
The North-South divide was highlighted at the conference and during the post-conference
era. The debate between developing and developed countries intensified during every
environmental conference from Stockholm to Rio de Janeiro, where the 1992 U.N. Conference
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on Environment and Development convened.264 While the United States made a distinct effort to
protect the interests of developing countries, LDCs perceived any environmental negotiation as a
threat to economic progress. Skepticism from developing countries halted the progress made at
Stockholm. A lack of state commitment to the Stockholm principles has slowed the
environmental movement.265 For instance, the ten-year moratorium on whaling proposed by the
United States was diminished to a yearly quota on fin and sperm whales by the International
Committee on Whaling.266 Commercial interests resisted the proposal made by the United States
and state actors did not make an effort to support the proposition.
The lack of support by nation states did not stop environmental initiatives completely.
The World Heritage Trust, created at the conference, has successfully conserved cultural sites
and combined the issues of conservation with cultural and historic memory. The group has
worked in developed and developing countries. The United Nation Environmental Program, also
created at the conference, governed this body, as well controlled any international environmental
initiatives after Stockholm. Despite these efforts, by the late 1980s the environment was still
deteriorating.267 It is evident that the conference did not live up to its promise. The State
Department said, in the Report on the UN Conference on the Human Environment, “Many critics
claim it was a poor effort. But perhaps the very fact that there was a conference and that an
action plan and a declaration were adopted by large majorities should in themselves be cause for
celebration.”268 While the promise of the conference was unfulfilled, the conference itself was a
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major testament to the commitment of nations to address the environmental perils the planet
faced. Stockholm represented something new, but the image of the United States is intertwined
with the legacy of the conference and that is still undetermined.
In some areas, the conference produced real results. The United Nations, to reward
developing countries that made significant progress in the field of environment, created a prize
for environmental activities. In October 1972, the United Nations presented Iran with the award
for most outstanding contribution to the human environment. The government of Iran set aside
areas of land that constituted as an important ecosystem to the United Nations.269 This represents
an important development after the conference as a member of the Third World took careful
steps to improving their environment. Maurice Strong worked with Iran before the conference
and advised them on environmental affairs.270 Their ideas before Stockholm and the programs it
produced after mark an important victory after the conference. To appease the developing world
further, the United Nations decided to place the UNEP headquarters in a developing country. The
United Nations picked Nairobi as the location and started work there in early 1973.271
Environmental negotiations have changed since the 1972 Stockholm Conference and yet
there has been significant continuity. After the conference was dismissed, the United Nations
Environmental Program, one of the most important products of the conference, assumed the duty
of coordinating all international environmental initiatives.272 The United States had a strong
presence in the program, which answers to the general U.N. body. Furthermore, Stockholm
provided the framework for subsequent negotiations including the 1992 United Nations
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Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. The principles created in the
Rio conference mirror the Stockholm Declaration.273 More recent environmental conferences do
diverge from Stockholm in a major way. Environmental NGOs during latter conferences have
been allotted more input in the preparatory processes and conferences proper.274 The shift from
state to non-state actors has changed the demographics of environmental negotiations and altered
the discussion on the balance between development and environmental interests toward an
environmental favored discourse. Environmental negotiations are changing but Stockholm
played a major role in the way multilateral meetings are conducted.
Environmental organizations transformed in profound ways after the conference. ENGOs
became more involved in United Nations activities. In October 1972, the United Nations
Association of the USA convened a meeting on US NGO representation in the UN. The
association stated that they wished to hold this workshop because,
NGOs and other concerned citizens are increasingly troubled by the silence
surrounding UN matters in statements by both political parties, and by the
extremely low visibility the UN has in the mass media. The Executive Committee
of the Conference of UN Representatives has planned the October 3rd workshop to
provide NGOs with information and techniques to help them raise the UN’s
visibility.275
After the conference, the United Nations recognized the value ENGOs brought to their institution
and sought to utilize their expertise and ability to mobilize public support. ENGO actions during
the conference established their relevancy on the international stage and the United Nations
rewarded their efforts with further opportunities for participation.
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Ten years after the conference convened, ENGOs looked back at their efforts and
recognized the importance of the conference in the transformation of their organizations. NGOs
met in May 1982 for the NGO Symposium on Environment and the Future to commemorate the
tenth anniversary of the Stockholm Conference. In a letter from UNEP to the NGO
representatives, the agency noted that NGOs played a crucial role in the conference.276 The
meeting noted that NGOs pledged to “live as citizens of a loved yet endangered planet and to
share our common heritage with respect for all living things and in justice and amity, with the
people of the earth.”277 The Stockholm Conference, ENGOs realized, symbolized a promise to
the environment and to its people. It served as the beginning of their career as diplomatic agents
and guardians of the world environment.
ENGOs were vital to promoting environmentalism. As UNEP stated in its time before the
1982 NGO symposium, “During the 1960s, NGOs played a crucial role in promoting awareness
among the public and lobbying governments on environmental issues, thereby helping to create
the conditions which eventually led to the Stockholm Conference.”278 EGNOs, specifically
American ENGOs, are important to understanding the Stockholm Conference. Their efforts at
the national level forced the creation of environmental consciousness that led to the conference.
Furthermore, their actions at the conference paved the way for their relevancy in international
environmental affairs in the following decades. American ENGOs are intrinsic to the story of
Stockholm and their continuing efforts make a case for their importance in the history of the
contemporary world.
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